Trump could save Taiwan, but he needs a history lesson first

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Associated Press

President Donald Trump listed to Environmental Protection Agency director Lee Zeldin as he talks with reporters before boarding Air Force One at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York, early Tuesday, June 9, 2026. (AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein)

On Dec. 7, 1941, Imperial Japan dramatically expanded World War II in the Pacific — and not only by attacking U.S. forces in Pearl Harbor . That same day, it opened its Southeast Asia campaign by launching planes against the Philippines  from the island then known as Formosa.

For the duration of the conflict, Taiwan, which Gen. Douglas MacArthur called the “ unsinkable aircraft carrier, ” served as the logistical and transit point for Japan’s aggressive operations throughout the region.

With its surrender to end World War II, Japan renounced its claim to Taiwan,  which it had occupied since the Sino-Japan war in 1895. Several post-war international agreements addressed Taiwan  and either were silent on its future status or explicitly declared (the official position of the U.S.) that it remained to be determined.

In January 1950, the U.S. carried  its neutral posture toward Taiwan and South Korea to the point of not including either country within the Asia-Pacific security perimeter announced by the Truman administration. That turned out to be a historically fatal strategic decision. The Soviet Union, its communist Chinese ally and North Korean proxy coveted Taiwan and South Korea, respectively.

Joseph Stalin interpreted the U.S. position as an effective green light and gave the go-ahead to Kim Il Sung — Kim Jong Un’s grandfather and the first of the Kim family dictators — to invade South Korea across the 38th Parallel. Washington immediately reversed  its hands-off approach, entered the Korean War, and deployed the Seventh Fleet  in the Taiwan Strait to keep Taiwan’s anti-communist dictator, Chiang Kai-shek, and communist tyrant Mao Zedong from starting a new war.

The next episode in the saga of China’s siege against Taiwan consisted of the shelling of Taiwan’s islands , Quemoy (Kinmen) and Matsu, in 1954 and 1958, in what are known as the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises. The renewed communist expansion in the region led to the execution of the U.S.-Republic of China Mutual Security Treaty  in 1954, along with an identical commitment to South Korea and the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization .

The regional security situation and the U.S. commitment to Taiwan became a major issue in the 1960 presidential debate between Vice President Richard Nixon and Sen. John Kennedy (D-Mass.), with Nixon taking a more assertive pro-Taiwan stance. Kennedy’s assassination and the ascendancy of the relatively unknown Lyndon Johnson to the presidency essentially put a pause on events related to Taiwan.

Nixon, elected on his second run for president in 1968, launched his opening to China, with Taiwan constituting the major subject of the negotiations. The Shanghai Communique in 1972  laid out the two sides’ public positions. The People’s Republic claimed sovereignty over Taiwan, which it had never governed, and the U.S. “acknowledged” and “did not challenge” China’s position but “expect[ed]” the status of the Republic of China to be resolved “peacefully.”

In 1979, President Carter finished what Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were clearly contemplating — the peaceful transfer of U.S. diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China and termination of the 1954 treaty with Taiwan. Within months, an irate Congress, reflecting the deep well of American affection and support for Taiwan, passed the Taiwan Relations Act by overwhelming bipartisan majorities. The act affirmed an ongoing U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security and its economic and political well-being, but without formally committing to intervene militarily.

President Reagan in 1982 matched Congress’s pro-Taiwan sympathies with his own, issuing a set of principles — the Six Assurances  — governing U.S. treatment of Taiwan. Arms sales to Taiwan were to be determined bilaterally, without consultation with China. Again, Reagan made no direct pledge to defend Taiwan.

In 1996, before its first direct presidential election, Beijing fired missiles toward Taiwan  and asked President Clinton’s defense representative what the U.S. would do if China attacked. The response — “ We don’t know and you don’t know. It would depend on the circumstances ” — did not stop China’s missiles. Clinton sent a carrier battle group toward the strait. Beijing warned the ships would face “a sea of fire”  if they entered. Clinton ordered the ships to turn around and stay out.

President Trump is uniquely positioned to reassert America’s deterrent posture in the Indo-Pacific, by resuming regular carrier transits through the Taiwan Strait. He is the U.S. president best suited to match Pacific Co…