By SETH J. FRANTZMAN JUNE 18, 2026 11:06 Updated: JUNE 18, 2026 11:16 As the US and Iran sign a Memorandum of Understanding intended to pave the way for a broader agreement, there is a lot of commentary about the emerging deal.
The view among many is that this has been a loss for the US and Israel . The same voices that were very confident on February 28 when the conflict began are now resigned to what they see as a bad deal that will empower Iran and somehow leave Israel more isolated.
Itâs worth considering that, like in any conflict, the âenemy gets a vote.â Iran is a key player in what has transpired, and it's worth considering what the regimeâs game plan has been.
Over the years, Iran has generally sought not to sit down with the Trump administration. The regime didnât want talks with the first Trump administration, especially after the US walked away from the 2015 JCPOA . The Supreme Leader in Iran, who was killed at the opening of the February conflict, was suspicious of the West. When Trump walked away from the Iran Deal, it cemented a perception among Iranâs leadership that the US and the West could not be trusted.
This set in motion an Iranian attempt to basically turn off relations with the West and shift towards China. Iran already had close ties with Russia, but after 2018, it increasingly pursued a policy of working more closely with China and developing infrastructure to create a north-south economic corridor and expand trade with Central Asia. This didnât all pan out because Iranâs economy is in bad shape. Iran and China moved toward a 25-year agreement, but little Chinese investment flowed into Iran.
President Trump Attends G7 Summit In Evian, France EVIAN-LES-BAINS, FRANCE - JUNE 17: U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during a bilateral meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on the sidelines of the G7 Summit on June 17, 2026 in Evian-les-Bains, France. Leaders from the Group of 7 (credit: Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images) Iran brings nothing to Beijing in return
Beijing views Iran as a chaotic regime that doesnât offer a return on investment. As such, Beijing assumed it could actually get more trade with the Gulf and other countries than with Iran. Economic groupings such as BRICS, the SCO, and others offered Beijing more opportunities abroad. Iran was simply one of many countries.
Iran believed it would benefit from the October 7 war. It sought to create a multi-front war against Israel. This didnât succeed. Instead, Iran saw Hamas weakened and its Hezbollah partner badly beaten in the fall of 2024. Iranâs goal after this was to try to salvage its proxy network.
When the new Trump administration appeared, Iran signaled it was open to indirect talks. The indirect talks format meant any discussions would be slow. Iran and the US turned to Oman to be a mediator. The talks failed when Israel began airstrikes in June 2025. The US followed this up with strikes of its own, and Iran and the US turned to Qatar to end the conflict.
From Iranâs point of view, the June 2025 attacks showed that Iranâs air defenses and many other weapons programs were a paper tiger. Iran had launched large numbers of missiles at Israel, not only in June 2025 but also in two large salvos in 2024. Iran saw that its missile attacks would not win a war with Israel. Now Iran was presented with a strategy against Israel similar to the one Hezbollah was conducting. The goal was for the regime to survive and continue low-level attacks. It couldnât win, but by not losing it could claim a kind of victory.
When Israel and the US attacked Iran on February 28, the Iranian regime was already prepared for a strategy of ânot losingâ as a way of âwinning.â Iran is a large country, some 150 times larger than Lebanon. If Israel couldnât defeat Hamas or Hezbollah, Iran reasoned that it could hold out as well. Holding out became Iranâs strategy.
The US and Israel didnât have a clear strategic goal
The US and Israel didnât have a clear strategic goal. Israelâs Prime Minister in March did claim that Iran had been so decimated that it could no longer enrich uranium or produce ballistic missiles. Ostensibly, these were Israelâs war goals.
But the goals had mission creep. Mission creep worked in Iranâs favor. Rather than a short conflict as in June 2025, Iran faced a long conflict of diminishing returns for the US and Israel, the kind of conflict that might benefit Tehran.
Iran acted to close the Strait of Hormuz and attack the Gulf and Iraq. Iran assumed that it could more effectively wage war in its neighborhood, while clawing back some influence over policy in Lebanon. As such, Iranâs goal was to prolong the conflict and negotiations. As long as Iran could return to something like a status quo, it could say it had won.
In any kind of game, if one side wins by not losing and the other side has to win, then clearly the side that needs to win has a much more complex road ahead.
Israel and the US chose this path, which put them at a poâŠ
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