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FranceSports4/2/2026

Ghost Journalists, Cash and Kremlin Scripts: How Russian Operatives Tried To Influence Argentinian Media

Documents from October 2024 suggest that Argentinian authorities began monitoring 'The Company's' activities, including interactions with opposition politicians. In June 2025, government spokesperson Manuel Adorni claimed intelligence services had uncovered a network of Russian spies engaged in disinformation campaigns. Adorni named Russian citizen Lev Konstantinovich as the financier and organizer of local collaborations, with his wife, Irina Iakovenko, involved in content creation, NGO influence, focus group organization, and political intelligence gathering. The Inside r reported on Adorni'

Documents dated October 2024 reflect a shift in the narrative. Argentinian authorities appear to have begun tracking “The Company’s” activities, particularly their exchanges with opposition politicians. Documents noted that “the agreements reached with opposition forces will allow further work to be conducted within the country using local actors.” Months later, in June 2025, Argentinian government spokesperson Manuel Adorni said intelligence services had uncovered an alleged network of Russian spies involved in disinformation campaigns.

Adorni identified Russian citizen Lev Konstantinovich as responsible for financing operations and establishing links with local collaborators, while his wife, Irina Iakovenko, was allegedly involved in content creation, efforts to influence NGOs, organizing focus groups, and collecting political intelligence in support of Russian interests. The Inside r also echoed Adorni’s announcement, sharing an additional photo of the couple . In response to questions from our consortium, Konstantinovich said Adorni’s claims were “untrue,” and that neither he, nor his wife, “contacted the media, journalists, or Argentinian political figures.” They also had “no connection” to ‘The Company’ nor had “any evidence been presented to support these accusations, simply because none exists.”

Argentinian senator Patricia Bullrich, who served as Minister of Security from 2023 to December 2025, told Filtraleaks that she had been warned about Russian disinformation activities by mid-2025 by U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem. Noem did not mention “The Company” but referred to payments made to media outlets and journalists. According to sources consulted by Forbidden Stories, “The Company” left Argentina by November 2025.

The mission in the country produced few, if any, of its intended outcomes. Argentina joined the Rammstein Format in support of Ukraine in June 2024, and maintained its public backing of Kyiv until Donald Trump’s shift on the conflict, later in 2025, although Milei and Volodymyr Zelensky continued to meet and engage in discussions thereafter. Milei’s party, La Libertad Avanza , strengthened rather than faltered, securing a strong result in the 2025 legislative elections. Finally, tensions with Chile didn’t materialize. Instead, the regional trajectory points toward alignment, as following left-wing Gabriel Boric’s exit, Chile’s new president since 2026, José Antonio Kast (described as the most conservative leader since dictator Augusto Pinochet, from 1973 to 1990), has signaled his priorities by choosing Argentina for his first foreign visit.

The internal documents accessed by our consortium should be read critically. In a conversation with France 24 , a partner of this investigation, Maxime Audinet, a specialist in Russian politics, said the documents contain no “qualitative criteria” of the impact or success of these operations. He argued the more pertinent question was: “Who were the leaked documents intended for?”

The internal documents appear as attempts to illustrate the “success” of the campaigns. While they state that “The Company” spent more than $7.3 million between January and September 2024, with roughly two-thirds allocated to “political science” and the remainder to “media placements,” this consortium was unable to determine how much of that budget was actually used to commission articles, some of which appear to be priced artificially high, or signed by fake personas ( a strategy used previously in this sort of influence campaigns ). A close reading also suggests efforts to inflate the perceived scale of operations, including the duplication of some of the articles in internal spreadsheets used to stage influence campaigns across Africa and Latin America.

Russian power circles may also be questioning the success of the campaigns. According to a source familiar with the matter contacted by Forbidden Stories , an internal audit was reportedly discussed in December 2025 within the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service to trace how some of the funds were spent . “Not all the financial figures in these documents should be taken at face value,” Audinet said, citing what he described as the “endemic and intrinsic corruption within this system” of Russian propaganda, already observed during the Wagner Group era.

Additionally, the documents mention “The Company” successfully displayed a banner during a football match that discourages support for Ukraine. It also allegedly commissioned graffiti in the capital “targeting” Milei.

Read the full article at Forbidden Stories
Source document: Manuel Adorni

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Forbidden StoriesIndependentCenter4/2/2026
Ghost Journalists, Cash and Kremlin Scripts: How Russian Operatives Tried To Influence Argentinian Media

Documents from October 2024 suggest that Argentinian authorities began monitoring 'The Company's' activities, including interactions with opposition politicians. In June 2025, government spokesperson Manuel Adorni claimed intelligence services had uncovered a network of Russian spies engaged in disinformation campaigns. Adorni named Russian citizen Lev Konstantinovich as the financier and organizer of local collaborations, with his wife, Irina Iakovenko, involved in content creation, NGO influence, focus group organization, and political intelligence gathering. The Inside r reported on Adorni'

Bias read (Center): The article presents information from multiple sources, including government officials and individuals accused of involvement, without overtly favoring one side. It includes direct quotes from both the accused and the accusers, maintaining a balanced presentation of conflicting claims.

Official sources cited

  • government Manuel Adorni
  • other Lev Konstantinovich
  • other Irina Iakovenko

Go to the primary sources (3)

The official sources this coverage is built on. Read them directly to bypass framing.

  • governmentManuel Adorni
  • otherLev Konstantinovich
  • otherIrina Iakovenko