Downfall of a Superstar

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Picture alliance/Anadolu/Selcuk Acar. Annalena Baerbock, President of the UN General Assembly and former German Foreign Minister.

Germany’s humiliating defeat in the race for a UN Security Council seat reveals the price of a foreign policy increasingly seen as hypocritical abroad.

The United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday elected Austria, Kyrgyzstan, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago and Zimbabwe to the 15-member U.N. Security Council for two-year terms starting on January 1, 2027.

Germany, which had lobbied hard for a seat, came third for the two places contested by the Western European and Others Group, with 104 votes, against 134 for Portugal and 131 for Austria.-- Reuters

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Jun 8 2026 (IPS) - This is the downfall of a diplomatic superstar. Germany’s defeat in the election to the UN Security Council is the consequence of a foreign policy that has proven disastrous in recent times, failing to uphold either the values or the interests of the Federal Republic.

The fact that the second-largest contributor to the UN has been punished so severely by Portugal and Austria highlights a global loss of trust that had not yet been fully realised in political Berlin.

‘We are seen as someone who defends the rules-based order; as an advocate of international law’, Foreign Minister Johann Wampold lectured just hours before the election. And in doing so, he revealed the gulf between Germany’s self-perception and the way it is perceived internationally. It is quite clear that on this very issue – the extent to which the Federal Republic actually stands up for binding rules and international law – there has been massive damage to its reputation, which is now, for the first time, resulting in political consequences.

International law à la carte

Germany’s global alienation can be traced very precisely to the Israeli war in Gaza, which stirred up international passions like hardly any other conflict. The problem here is not merely the stance perceived as highly one-sided in large parts of the world.

It is the palpable discrepancy with Germany’s conduct in Ukraine and with the general self-image of a country that likes to parade through the world with a particularly raised moral finger.

If in one instance – quite rightly – one loudly condemns war crimes and calls on the whole world even more loudly to do the same, yet in the other case remains silent, grants the perpetrators diplomatic and political cover, and even supplies them with weapons (even though the crimes are far more serious by all objective standards), it is hardly surprising to be accused of double standards and hypocrisy.

The damage to Germany’s reputation is all the more severe because the country was regarded for decades as a safe bet in foreign policy. Like hardly any other state, the Federal Republic stood for strengthening multilateral institutions.

First, the former capital of West Germany, Bonn, then Berlin, supported the development of an international judiciary. Precisely as a lesson from its own history and in its own well-understood interest as a country at the heart of a continent once ravaged by war, Germany committed itself with vigour and generosity to peace and the balancing of interests.

It is only in recent times that the ‘reason of state’, now invoked like a mantra, has emerged, towering above all else as a foreign-policy creed imbued with an almost sacred significance.

For a long time, incidentally, it was possible to adopt a stance on the Middle East conflict that did justice both to Germany’s historical responsibility towards Israel and to the legitimate concerns of the Palestinians and Arabs. It is only in recent times that the ‘reason of state’, now invoked like a mantra, has emerged, towering above all else as a foreign-policy creed imbued with an almost sacred significance.

Foreign countries in particular, which do indeed take note of the largely self-referential German discourse, may well ask: does this raison d’état actually have any moral limits? Or does it also cover up war crimes, ethnic cleansing and what even highly reputable experts and institutions describe – to put it mildly – as genocidal conditions ?

For the raison d’état is, after all, not a product of realpolitik interests, but is proclaimed as a kind of higher morality, and thus as a lesson from German history that other countries should, please, understand. Many there see rather a German failure to draw universal lessons from its own history, possibly even a kind of unwelcome historical continuity.

The self-portrayal as a ‘champion of international law’ – which was, after all, the main argument put forward for the now-failed German campaign for a seat on the UN Security Council – also seems rather odd in light of a series of statements made by the Chancellor. For instance, Friedric…