Chief Judge Pryor's Non-Order in the Eleanor Ross Judicial Misconduct Proceedings: Why It Is So Problematic and What Might Be Done About It

I have written quite a bit about Judge Ross's extrajudicial activities. I've also written how the Eleventh Circuit Judicial Council, and Chief Judge Pryor in particular, have handled this issue. Last Friday, I raised some questions about how Judge Pryor addressed Judge Ross's apology letter:

How does Chief Judge Pryor have this authority? Did the other (unnamed) members of the Council agree to this plan? Moreover, it seems that Pryor decided not to investigate Ross further based on her making her private reprimand into a public reprimand. How does he have that authority? Judge Ross would have never consented to any reprimand if it was public. Judge Pryor nullified the cornerstone of the Judicial Council's agreement with Judge Ross.

I am thankful that Professor Arthur Hellman addresses some of these questions in the following guest post.

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The judicial misconduct proceedings involving Federal District Judge Eleanor Ross of Atlanta continue to generate controversy, much of it fueled by a blockbuster expose published by the New York Times on June 11. In this guest post I'll flag seven (mostly) procedural irregularities and suggest what might be done to clean up the mess that the proceedings have become. These points may seem technical, and to some extent they are, but many of them concern a basic question: who decides? The post assumes general familiarity with prior developments, summarized in the Times story.

A. Bypassing the Judicial Council

1. The Feb. 11, 2026, order of the Eleventh Circuit Judicial Council (incorporating the findings and recommendations of the Council's Special Committee, which investigated the matter) stated: "Any apology [issued in connection with the sanction] should be sufficiently specific so as to make clear to the recipient the sexual misconduct for which the judge is apologizing." That order was made public on May 22, when the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability of the Judicial Conference of the United States (JC&D Committee) issued its order affirming it.

On June 8, four of Judge Ross's former law clerks (whose unease about the sexual activity taking place in the judge's chambers led to the initial complaint) wrote to the Judicial Council stating that they did not believe that the three-sentence apology letters they had received complied with the provision just quoted. The law clerks' letter went to Chief Judge William Pryor, who wrote to Judge Ross on June 10 asking her to respond to the "allegations." He specifically asked her to "state whether [she] failed to send adequate letters of apology to [her] former law clerks." He implied that if her response was not satisfactory, she might be subject to more severe discipline than the private reprimand she had received. He gave her a deadline of June 12.

On June 11, Judge Ross sent new letters to the law clerks and informed Judge Pryor of her action. Judge Pryor responded with a second letter , also on June 11, saying, in effect, that he would take no further action against Judge Ross. With Judge Ross's consent, he disclosed the new apology letters to The New York Times, which published a second story on June 12.

Judge Pryor's brief letter did not say whether Judge Ross had sent any response other than the new letters. Based on the public record, it is fair to conclude that Judge Ross acknowledged, at least implicitly, that her initial apology letters were not adequate.

The "procedural" problem here is that the apology requirement was part of the sanctions imposed by the Judicial Council – the only entity authorized to impose sanctions under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (JCDA). By alerting Judge Ross to the possible inadequacy of the first set of apology letters, Judge Pryor implicitly invited her to write a new set that would be treated as compliant. That is certainly how Judge Ross read the letter. But it seems to me that only the Council could properly determine (a) whether Judge Ross should be given a second chance to comply with the apology provision of the Feb. 11 order and (b) if so, whether the new letters did comply.

2. The Feb. 11 Judicial Council order determined that a private reprimand was a sufficient sanction, and therefore it did not identify Judge Ross. Chief Judge Pryor's letters of June 10 and June 11 are the first official acknowledgment that Judge Ross is the "Subject Judge" referred to in the order. Judge Pryor's two letters have been posted on the Eleventh Circuit website. But the Feb. 11 order remains as it was originally issued, and the Council (as far as we know) has not been given a chance to reconsider its sanction and how it is to be reported. Again, Judge Pryor chose to bypass the Council.

3. Chief Judge Pryor's June 11 letter stated that he had decided not to identify a second complaint against Judge Ross. But under the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings ( JC&D Rules ) he could, instead, have identified a new complaint and then dismiss…