Antonio Martín Carrillo, el ingeniero que puso en marcha el LZB en 1992: "Es una vergüenza que se culpe a un trabajador, falló el sistema"

Spanish Transport Minister Oscar Puente defended the railway network’s maintenance record following the recent crash at Urda, stating that spending has doubled compared to 2011. Adif, the infrastructure manager, plans to allocate 1.37 billion euros for track upkeep this year, up from approximately 700 million euros in 2011. Puente argued during his appearance after the accident that this increase is undeniable regardless of how it is measured. This defense implies that two fatal accidents in less than a year were results of bad luck rather than mismanagement. The incident occurred near a recently replaced switch point, known locally as a turnout. Antonio Martin Carrillo, an aerospace engineer who helped launch Spain’s high-speed rail system in 1992, criticized the government’s explanation. He served as head of Strategic Programs in Adif’s Innovation Subdirectorship and advised the president of Renfe. Carrillo noted that a close family friend, composer Marisa Manchado, was aboard one of the trains involved. As of late October, her condition remained critical. Carrillo rejected the narrative that blamed individual workers for the disaster. He described the Line Blocking System, or LZB, as old but reliable technology purchased from Germany in the 1990s. Although the system prevents collisions and allows tight train spacing, it is aging and lacks modern European alternatives like ERTMS. When the LZB fails, trains lose communication with safety systems and halt automatically. In the Urda area, eight trains stopped when the system went down. Operators were supposed to reset the system before resuming movement. Carrillo questioned why the system had not been updated years earlier. He pointed out that frequent failures of the LZB are common, suggesting that daily glitches create dangerous conditions. While Minister Puente claimed computer crashes caused the failure, Carrillo asked why backup systems did not function. He warned that evidence might be manipulated to shield top officials from responsibility. This concern follows the investigation into the previous Adamuz accident, which he described as stalled. Investigators have left their post, the committee chair was dismissed, and the office moved to Cordoba. Rail break samples from Adamuz were never sent to laboratories, leaving causes unclear. Audio recordings from the Urda scene have sparked debate. Carrillo suggested that selective leaks of conversations could distort the truth. He emphasized that protocols cannot rely on human perfection and that blaming the weakest link is unacceptable. The engineer urged for a thorough investigation into both the technical failures and administrative decisions. He highlighted that the switch involved in the crash had been newly installed, yet its exact location and status remain unknown. Public scrutiny focuses on whether the doubling of maintenance costs translated into safer operations. Critics argue that the current management approach obscures systemic issues. The contrast between budget figures and safety outcomes remains central to the political fallout. Officials continue to face questions about the adequacy of the legacy signaling infrastructure. The fate of passengers and the integrity of the ongoing inquiry depend on transparent findings. Until then, doubts persist regarding the root causes of these consecutive tragedies.