Palestinian Death Toll In Gaza Tops 73,000 As Israel Continues Launching Strikes Despite Ceasefire

The roles played by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia , Qatar, and Turkey in facilitating the “ Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding ” underscore the extent to which regional actors have invested in creating off-ramps for the United States and Iran , and steering the conflict away from further escalation.

Across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), this diplomatic off-ramp has garnered broad relief that the conflict appears to be moving toward de-escalation as Washington and Tehran prepare for talks on the sensitive nuclear and non-nuclear issues. But where the United Arab Emirates (UAE) fits into this broader picture is far from straightforward.

Navigating Israel, Iran, and GCC sensitivities

Although Abu Dhabi is unlikely to openly challenge the Trump administration’s decision to sign the “Islamabad MoU,” it is no secret that Emirati officials have been displeased with Pakistan’s bridging role between Washington and Tehran.

Abu Dhabi appears to believe that U.S. and Israeli military operations should have continued longer to further weaken Iran before any ceasefire took hold. Regardless of what this extended ceasefire ultimately achieves, the Emirati leadership will emerge more suspicious of Tehran’s intentions and more determined to deepen cooperation with Israel in countering the Islamic Republic, while still leaving the door open to future diplomatic engagement with Iran.

Cementing Abu Dhabi’s threat perception is the fact that, throughout the war, Iran hit the UAE with more than 3,000 drones and missiles, which was more than the number of such attacks on the other five GCC members combined .

Israel’s deployment of the Iron Dome system and military personnel to the UAE during the war also left a lasting impression on Emirati officials. “Iran’s attacks against the UAE have strengthened the Emirati-Israeli relationship. The UAE suffered a disproportionate number of Iranian attacks and appreciated the support it received from Israel — support it is not likely to forget even after a ceasefire goes into effect,” explained Gordon Gray, the former U.S. ambassador to Tunisia, in an interview with RS.

However, Abu Dhabi’s deepening partnership with Tel Aviv risks exacerbating tensions with other GCC members that increasingly view Israel as a threat. Israel’s bombing of Doha in September 2025 informed perceptions in Saudi Arabia that Tel Aviv’s willingness to project force beyond its borders poses a threat to the kingdom and other Gulf monarchies that have declined to join the Israeli normalization camp.

Against this backdrop, the UAE’s growing alignment with Israel could become a major source of friction with Saudi Arabia, particularly when viewed alongside Abu Dhabi’s exit earlier this year from OPEC and OPEC+; its support for the Southern Transitional Council (STC)’s short-lived territorial advances in southern and eastern Yemen; and its backing of Somaliland and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Officials in Riyadh regard these aspects of Emirati foreign policy as harming Saudi interests.

At this stage, as Saudi Arabia and Qatar seek non-aggression pacts with the Islamic Republic, and with Oman’s ties to Iran having essentially weathered the war unscathed, Israel and Iran are likely to revert to a “ war between the wars .” As in the 2010s and early 2020s, this would involve proxy activity, intelligence operations, targeted assassinations, cyberwarfare, and other forms of indirect confrontation. While the UAE will likely make considerable efforts to avoid appearing openly aligned with Tel Aviv in such a shadowy conflict, the possibility of covert Emirati support for Israel should not be ruled out.

If the “Islamabad MoU” leads to the U.S. and Iran reaching a more lasting and comprehensive deal, “you would likely see a resumption of the Israeli-Iranian ‘shadow war’ with the UAE clandestinely assisting Israel, through intelligence sharing or joint surveillance,” Rob Geist Pinfold, who teaches International Security at King’s College London, said. He told RS that this could “complicate UAE-GCC relations if the remainder of the Gulf continues to see Israel increasingly as a threat.”

Although Abu Dhabi’s exit from OPEC and its growing cooperation with Israel have increasingly positioned it as somewhat of an “ outlier ” within the GCC, Emirati leaders are likely to continue coordinating with their Gulf counterparts whenever doing so serves the UAE’s national interests. In practical terms, the UAE is expected to deepen cooperation with Israel, particularly in efforts to counter an Iran that has emerged from the war emboldened and radicalized , while carefully managing the optics of that relationship to avoid being perceived as excessively aligned with Tel Aviv by fellow GCC members and Arab public opinion.

As a result, Abu Dhabi faces a “difficult balancing act,” according to Jelena Novakov, a Belgrade-based geopolitical analyst who writes for Kosovo Online. The UAE is likely to continue cooperating with Israel in a…