The more overt phase of centralisation in India unfolded with dramatic speed soon after the Bharatiya Janata Party returned to power in May 2019. On August 5 of that year, the Modi government stunned the nation and the world by revoking Article 370, stripping Jammu and Kashmir of its special constitutional status. Not only was this done without the consent of the State’s elected assembly (which was conveniently under President’s Rule), but the State was also split into two Union Territories – Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh – directly administered from Delhi. Though the move was hailed by some as the end of an outdated arrangement, scholars had long argued that the true federal autonomy promised by Article 370 had already been hollowed out over the decades, with successive governments – and at times the Supreme Court – systematically reducing it to a symbolic provision. The Modi government merely delivered the final blow.
But the centralising push didn’t end there. In December 2019, Parliament passed the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA), which for the first time made religion a criterion for Indian citizenship – openly excluding Muslims from the list of persecuted minorities eligible for fast-tracked citizenship from select neighbouring countries. This marked a profound shift in the constitutional idea of secularism. Several opposition ruled State governments not only opposed the CAA but also refused to implement it and challenged it in the Supreme Court, asserting their right to resist what they saw as an unconstitutional law. Around the same time, the government passed the Triple Talaq Act, focusing specifically on Muslim personal law, and shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court handed down a unanimous verdict clearing the way for the construction of a Ram Temple at the site of the demolished Babri Masjid in Ayodhya. The temple was inaugurated in January 2024 with great fanfare – further signalling a Hindu majoritarian shift in the national narrative.
While these may seem like cultural or religious flashpoints more than federal issues, they speak volumes about a new model of centralised power that aims to redefine the Indian state itself.
The Modi government’s heavy-handed response to the Covid-19 pandemic, for example, saw sweeping emergency measures that left millions of migrant workers stranded, while States were barely consulted. Human rights activists were arrested and jailed under stringent anti-terror laws, and protests – like those against the CAA – were often met with brutal crackdowns. This aggressive posture from the Centre appeared to give a green light to BJP-ruled States to follow suit: a string of anti-“love jihad” laws, beef protection regulations, and other policies targeting minorities were passed at the State level, all mirroring the ideological thrust from Delhi. The message was clear – States were no longer co-equal units in a federation, but increasingly, instruments for extending the Centre’s political and ideological vision. In this unfolding reality, federalism wasn’t just being undermined; it was being completely re-scripted.
Following the time-tested and notorious formula used during the Indira Gandhi regime and its successor Janata Party regime, the Central government under Modi also attempted to apply President’s Rule in three opposition-ruled States – Maharashtra, Arunachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand – where defections or intra-party struggles offered opportunities to challenge the incumbent government’s authority in the State legislatures. In all three instances, however, the courts intervened to overturn the attempted imposition. It is in the fourth instance of the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir that several other Constitutional mandates have come under stress in recent years. The Centre imposed its rule in the State in 2017 itself when the Mehbooba Mufti government lost its majority following the withdrawal of support from the BJP.
On top of all this, recent years have also seen frequent clashes between State governments and their Governors (who are centrally appointed), adding yet another layer to the growing rift between the Centre and the States.
As legal scholar Faizan Mustafa notes, “It appears that Governors appointed by the current government have gone far beyond their counterparts appointed by earlier dispensations in making elected State governments non-functional. There has been a tug-of-war over multiple issues – the appointment of vice-chancellors, nominations to State legislative councils, the editing of the customary address by the Governor and the summoning of the House. Add to the list the delay or denial of assent to bills passed by legislative assemblies.”
Confrontations between State governments and Governors escalated after Narendra Modi began his second tenure as Prime Minister in 2019. Governments in West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Kerala and Punjab were particularly upset as their Governors took inordinately long to assent to bills passed by thei…
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