Disinformazione prima delle elezioni: video falsi, scandali inventati

Alleged disinformation campaigns ahead of state elections have emerged in Germany, with fabricated videos and invented scandals circulating online, according to multiple reports. The tactics appear to mirror strategies previously used by Russia in other countries, experts say. Among the targets are prominent politicians running in upcoming state elections in Berlin, Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, and Lower Saxony. The videos, designed to mimic legitimate media outlets, include false accusations against candidates such as Berlin’s governing mayor Kai Wegner of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The alleged disinformation campaign has been active since at least late June, according to investigations by Zeit, Spiegel, and Deutsche Welle. Initially, the effort began with fake front pages of German newspapers. These were followed by video content featuring fabricated corruption allegations. Over time, the nature of the claims became more extreme, including accusations of murder, abuse, and human trafficking. One example involves a video posted on X, formerly known as Twitter, which falsely accuses Wegner of attempting to kill a tennis player using a racket and tampering with the individual's car brakes. The video features a synthetic voice and appears to be styled after the design of taz, a well-known German newspaper. However, it is clearly a forgery. The taz has taken legal action against those responsible for the fabrication. According to sources, all major political parties except the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Brandenburg Social Welfare Party (BSW) have been targeted. In Berlin, the video mentions several leading candidates, including Stefan Evers of the CDU, the Greens' Werner Graf and Bettina Jarasch, the Left Party's Elif Eralp and Steffen Krach of the SPD, along with other elected officials and candidates. Screenshots obtained by taz confirm these names are included in the fabricated content. Experts suggest this current wave of disinformation exhibits new characteristics compared to previous efforts. Julia Smirnova from the Center for Monitoring, Analysis and Strategy (Cemas) noted that while similar tactics have been observed in countries such as Moldova, Armenia, Ukraine, and France, the scale and focus on regional elections in Germany mark a distinct evolution. Cemas has documented over 40 instances involving politicians in the four states preparing for elections. Smirnova emphasized that the primary goal of these campaigns is to incite conflict, spread divisive topics, and deepen existing divisions, particularly between eastern and western Germany. This approach aligns with broader Russian influence operations, such as the Matryoshka project, which has been monitored by Cemas for years. The distribution strategy of these disinformation materials follows a structured pattern. Initially, the content appears on platforms such as Telegram and pro-Russian forums. From there, it is shared by so-called seed accounts on networks like X. These accounts often remain inactive for long periods before suddenly becoming active again. Notably, they operate primarily during weekdays, suggesting human involvement rather than automated bots. Once these initial posts gain traction, they are widely reposted by automated accounts. Subsequently, users known as quoters strategically share the content as responses under posts made by journalists, politicians, or public figures. This method aims to maximize visibility, even if the false claims are eventually exposed. Despite the exposure of some of these fabricated stories, the overall impact remains unclear. Political parties have responded by issuing statements condemning the disinformation and emphasizing their commitment to transparency. Some have launched internal reviews to assess potential vulnerabilities in their digital presence. Meanwhile, cybersecurity experts continue to monitor the situation, warning that similar tactics could resurface closer to election day. Authorities have yet to identify the originators of these disinformation campaigns. However, the coordinated nature of the effort suggests a centralized operation, possibly linked to foreign interests. As the election season approaches, the effectiveness of countermeasures will become increasingly critical in maintaining public trust in the electoral process.