Izvješće: SAD se boji da bi Izrael mogao ciljati iranske pregovarače tijekom mirovnih pregovora

In early 2026, reports emerged indicating that U.S. officials were deeply concerned about the possibility that Israel might take direct action against key Iranian diplomats engaged in peace talks. These fears arose amid ongoing negotiations aimed at de-escalating tensions between the United States and Iran, which had been locked in a protracted conflict since early 2024. According to a detailed account by *The New York Times*, U.S. officials became increasingly worried in April that Israel might target two prominent Iranian figures—Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—who were playing crucial roles in the diplomatic process.

The concern stemmed from the belief that any attempt to eliminate these individuals could severely undermine the fragile peace talks and potentially reignite hostilities in the region. This fear was significant enough to prompt Washington to reach out to regional allies, urging them to discreetly convey to Tehran that these officials could be at risk. Despite these warnings, the negotiations continued, though with heightened security measures around the Iranian delegation.

The divergence in strategic goals between the United States and Israel has become increasingly apparent as the conflict evolved. Initially, both nations had coordinated their military actions against Iran after hostilities broke out on February 28, 2024. However, the Trump administration gradually pivoted towards securing an interim agreement with Iran, focusing on stabilizing the situation rather than pursuing broader military objectives. In contrast, Israeli leaders remained wary of concluding the conflict without achieving deeper strategic gains against Iran’s military infrastructure and influence in the region.

Israeli military planning from the start of the conflict had centered on targeting key elements of Iran’s leadership structure. Although U.S. officials recognized that Araghchi and Ghalibaf might have been considered legitimate military targets in the initial phases of the war, they came to believe that striking these individuals once negotiations had begun would jeopardize the diplomatic progress made so far. This shift in perspective reflected a growing recognition among U.S. policymakers that preserving the negotiation channel was critical to preventing further escalation.

Historically, Israel had already taken steps against several high-ranking Iranian officials who were seen as potential interlocutors. Among those targeted were Ali Larijani, Iran’s top national security official, and Kamal Kharazi, a former foreign minister. Both were killed during the conflict, underscoring the risks associated with engaging in direct dialogue with Iran.

Tensions between Washington and Jerusalem regarding the negotiations have been well-documented. Earlier in the year, reports suggested that Araghchi and Ghalibaf had briefly appeared on an Israeli target list but were subsequently removed as U.S.-Iran diplomacy gained traction. However, U.S. officials later discovered that Ghalibaf remained under consideration and urged Israel to avoid taking any action against him.

Throughout the negotiations, security concerns for the Iranian delegation remained high. Prior to Ghalibaf’s trip to Islamabad in April for discussions with U.S. Vice President JD Vance, Iranian authorities reportedly sought reassurances through intermediaries in Pakistan and Qatar that Israel would not target members of the delegation. To ensure safe travel, Pakistani fighter jets accompanied the Iranian aircraft carrying over 70 delegates from the Iranian border to Islamabad. However, on the return leg of the journey, Iranian security personnel received intelligence suggesting that Israeli fighter jets had entered Iranian airspace from the west. As a result, the aircraft diverted to Mashhad before completing the approximately eight-hour journey back to Tehran via land.

Despite these security challenges, Araghchi and Ghalibaf continued to participate actively in the negotiations, later traveling to Qatar and Switzerland for further meetings with U.S. officials. Their involvement highlighted the delicate balance being maintained between ensuring the safety of the Iranian delegation and keeping the diplomatic process alive.

As of mid-2026, the United States and Iran remain engaged in efforts to finalize a comprehensive agreement following a recent memorandum of understanding aimed at halting hostilities and setting the stage for negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program and issues related to the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, Elisa Ewers, a former State Department official and current expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, suggests that the negotiations may extend beyond the current 60-day timeframe. Ewers notes that progress has been slow thus far and cautions that the current arrangement for toll-free passage through certain maritime routes might not endure indefinitely. Her insights underscore the complexity of the ongoing diplomatic efforts and the challenges ahead in reaching a lasting resolution to the conflict.