Ce fermier voulait quitter l'industrie de la cocaïne - il ne pouvait pas

A farmer named Perea in the remote province of Meta, Colombia, once decided to stop growing coca, the plant used to make cocaine. He removed the green bushes from his small farm, accessible only by river, and planted legal crops such as cassava and plantain. Perea was part of a government initiative intended to help farmers transition away from coca cultivation. However, the promised aid never fully arrived, and logistical challenges, such as poor road access and frequent flooding, made selling his legal crops difficult. In 2024, frustrated and desperate, Perea resumed growing coca. “It’s a tragedy,” he said. “But when you have children and no work, what choice do you have? If no help ever arrives, you go back to growing it.” Coca is an ancient plant traditionally used by indigenous communities in teas and medicines. Today, however, most of it is processed into cocaine. Colombia produces an estimated 70% of the world’s illegal cocaine supply. Researchers like Lucas Marín Llanes, who studies the coca economy and substitution strategies, note that coca has several advantages over other crops. Harvest cycles are shorter, allowing farmers to collect three or four harvests per year. The plant is easy to transport, and farmers know the prices they will receive. Studies show that coca cultivation can boost local economies, increasing municipal GDP by up to 10% in certain regions between 2014 and 2019. Despite these economic benefits, substitution programs aim to help farmers shift to legal alternatives. These initiatives were designed to provide financial support and technical assistance, enabling farmers to build sustainable livelihoods. Yet, according to recent reports, coca cultivation has reached record levels, exceeding 250,000 hectares. Many participants in substitution programs claim they have been let down by the government. Elena Hernández moved to the coca-growing region of Guaviare in the 1990s, drawn by higher wages. “There was more money back then, you could see it everywhere,” she recalled. “I managed to save and buy a small house.” However, the coca industry also brought violence and instability. Armed groups vied for control, while the government attempted to reduce production through manual eradication, aerial spraying, and arrests. These measures disrupted families’ income but failed to eliminate cultivation. In 2017, a national substitution program called the National Comprehensive Programme for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS) was launched. It followed the 2016 peace agreement between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Farmers who agreed to remove their coca plants received financial support and technical guidance, including help from agronomists and advice on soil management. While previous substitution efforts had existed, PNIS was the most extensive effort yet. Initially, it showed promise, with coca fields being replaced by lemon trees, bananas, and small livestock operations. Many farmers, like Hernández, avoided returning to coca. However, the program faced numerous challenges. Farmers reported that the government was not sufficiently committed. Payments were delayed, and technical support often failed to arrive. Weak state presence in rural areas and poor inter-agency coordination led to inadequate support reaching communities. As political priorities changed, momentum behind the program waned. When Iván Duque became president in 2018, the focus shifted toward eradication and security strategies. By the time Gustavo Petro assumed the presidency, the program had already lost much of its initial traction.