Propuesta de acuerdo de energía nuclear entre Estados Unidos y Arabia Saudita: lo que sabemos hasta ahora

President Donald Trump has approved a proposed agreement that would enable Saudi Arabia to develop a civilian nuclear program, potentially allowing the country to enrich uranium domestically, a move that marks a notable departure from U.S. non-proliferation policies, according to media reports. The agreement, which is expected to be presented to Congress for approval, would facilitate U.S. involvement in building Saudi Arabia's nuclear infrastructure. Reports indicate that Trump is anticipated to request congressional backing for the deal, which could open the door for American firms such as Westinghouse to assist in developing the kingdom’s nuclear sector. This comes amid ongoing discussions between the two nations aimed at strengthening their strategic relationship through energy and defense cooperation. The timing of the proposal has sparked controversy, particularly given the U.S. stance against Iran's alleged pursuit of nuclear capabilities. Officials have stated that one of the goals of the U.S. military campaign against Iran is to prevent it from acquiring the means to construct a nuclear weapon. Critics argue that enabling Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium might undermine this objective, even if the initiative is framed as purely civilian. Some analysts also warn that the technology required for uranium enrichment could be exploited for military purposes if not strictly controlled. Saudi Arabia has long sought to establish a civilian nuclear program as part of its economic diversification strategy, aiming to reduce reliance on oil revenues. Negotiations regarding U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation have spanned several presidential administrations. During the tenure of former President Joe Biden, these talks were linked to broader diplomatic efforts involving Saudi recognition of Israel. However, discussions stalled following Israel’s conflict with Hamas in Gaza. The Trump administration later resumed negotiations, eliminating the need for normalization of relations with Israel as a prerequisite. During Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to the United States last year, the two nations outlined a framework for civilian nuclear collaboration, setting the stage for a long-term partnership based on non-proliferation principles. This framework was described as a foundational step toward deeper bilateral ties. The proposed agreement, which spans three decades, would grant U.S. companies the opportunity to contribute to Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear sector. A key element of the deal would permit Saudi Arabia to engage in domestic uranium enrichment, based on a joint U.S.-Saudi study. While uranium enrichment is a routine process for producing reactor fuel, the same technology can be used to create highly enriched uranium, a material essential for nuclear weapons if further refined. Saudi officials have previously expressed a willingness to pursue nuclear arms if Iran were to acquire them, though Tehran maintains that its nuclear activities are solely for peaceful purposes. This historical context underscores the sensitivity surrounding the proposed agreement. Some experts have raised concerns about the terms of the deal, noting that it appears to deviate from the stringent standards set in previous agreements. In 2009, the United Arab Emirates entered into a “123 Agreement” with the U.S., committing to neither enrich uranium nor reprocess spent nuclear fuel, an arrangement widely regarded as the gold standard for non-proliferation. Reports suggest the Saudi agreement may not impose similar restrictions and could exclude the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which allows for more rigorous oversight of nuclear materials. Geopolitical analysts emphasize that the implications of the Saudi agreement extend beyond technical considerations. Michael Horowitz, a geopolitical expert, noted that the deal represents a significant shift, as it appears to fall short of established non-proliferation benchmarks. He highlighted that the absence of the Additional Protocol and the allowance for uranium enrichment could pose risks, as they may increase the likelihood of nuclear proliferation.