Russia is using missiles faster than it's producing them.

Russia has been using more missiles than it can produce, according to reports from Ukrainian military intelligence. Between July 1 and July 19, Russia launched 107 ballistic projectiles and 20 CircOn missiles, surpassing its estimated monthly production capacity. This surge in missile usage raises concerns over the sustainability of Russia’s stockpiles and its ability to maintain offensive operations in the coming months. The data comes from the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Agency (HUR), which estimates that Russia produces approximately 60 Iskander-M missiles and 40 RM-48U projectiles per month. These figures add up to around 100 ballistic projectiles monthly. However, between July 1 and July 19, Russian forces fired 107 such projectiles, exceeding the projected output by nearly 7 percent. The HUR also notes that Russia plans to manufacture only 30 CircOn missiles in 2026, yet 20 of them were already fired this month, accounting for two-thirds of the annual target. The increased rate of missile consumption suggests that Moscow may be depleting its strategic reserves. According to HUR assessments, Russia previously held more than 100 Iskander-M missiles, over 400 RM-48U projectiles, and more than 120 CircOn missiles. Recent data indicates that Russia had maintained a reserve of around 200 Iskander-M missiles as recently as December 2025. This implies that the country has begun intensifying the use of these stored stocks, likely in response to heightened pressure along the front lines. Military analysts suggest that the accelerated use of stored ammunition could be part of a broader strategy to penetrate Ukraine's air defense systems. By exhausting limited supplies of interceptors, Russia might aim to create temporary gaps in Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. However, experts warn that this approach risks further depleting critical reserves faster than they can be replenished. As the war continues, the depletion of these stocks could have long-term implications for Russia’s operational flexibility. In addition to the conventional missile arsenal, the CircOn system has drawn particular attention due to its unique characteristics. Independent analyst Fabian Hinz challenges the widespread belief that the 3M22 CircOn is a hypersonic maneuverable rocket. Instead, he classifies it as a quasi-ballistic projectile that follows a ballistic trajectory while retaining some degree of maneuverability. He argues that simplistic categorization into hypersonic or non-hypersonic weapons overlooks key differences in flight dynamics. Even if the CircOn does not fully meet the criteria for a true hypersonic glide vehicle, Hinz emphasizes that its speed and limited controllability still make it a formidable challenge for anti-missile systems. The weapon’s performance, combined with its potential for rapid deployment, underscores its significance in modern warfare. Analysts continue to monitor how Russia integrates such advanced systems into its overall combat strategy. As the conflict persists, the balance between supply and demand for munitions will remain a crucial factor in shaping battlefield outcomes. With Russia reportedly consuming more missiles than it can produce, the sustainability of its military campaigns, and the resilience of Ukraine’s defenses, will depend on how quickly both sides can adapt to evolving conditions. The situation remains fluid, with ongoing developments likely to shape the course of hostilities in the weeks ahead.