The Constitutional Judges and Pirc Musarjeva, in the style of Stanet Dolanc, tell the public: "We are the authorities!"
The article discusses the concept of separation of powers, particularly focusing on the judicial branch in Slovenia. It traces the historical development of this principle, starting with Montesquieu and later theorists like Tocqueville, and examines its implementation in various countries, including the United States and former Yugoslavia. In Slovenia, the Constitutional Court is highlighted as having a unique role in protecting the constitution and human rights, though its members are still appointed by the legislative body, which raises concerns about political influence. The piece notes that while the Constitutional Court is meant to be independent, its members' appointments often reflect the interests of the ruling coalition, potentially undermining its impartiality. This has led to situations where judges have been removed from office due to political pressures, such as the case of former Constitutional Council member Špela Mežnar. The article suggests that the current system allows political parties to secure long-term influence over the judiciary, thereby compromising the court’s legitimacy and independence.
On August 10, 2026, the Constitutional Court of Slovenia faced sharp criticism from members of the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), particularly from MP Žan Mahnič, who accused the court of being a “Marxist circle” or an extension of radical left-wing ideology. Mahnič claimed that the court’s decisions should be reconsidered “to what extent, if at all,” still be taken into account. His remarks came after the Constitutional Court, with seven votes in favor and one against, annulled a decision by the National Assembly regarding the illegality of a law on intervention measures for the development of Slovenia. The law had been proposed by the ruling party, which argued that it was necessary to strengthen executive power. The SDS, led by Prime Minister Janez Janša, has continued its pattern of systematic attacks on judicial independence over the past decade, especially during the third term of his government. Legal experts and international observers, including the European Commission, have repeatedly raised concerns about political influence on the judiciary. Even during the previous mandate, when the SDS was in opposition, these criticisms did not subside. Notable examples include public demonstrations before the Celje District Court, where the acquittal of a case involving Trenta was perceived by Janša’s supporters as evidence of a compromised judiciary. Mahnič’s comments were part of a broader strategy by the SDS to undermine the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court and other independent institutions. He used strong language, labeling the court as a “Marxist circle” and suggesting that its rulings should be ignored. This approach mirrors the rhetoric employed by Janša himself, who has often referred to the judiciary as representing “rule by un-elected officials.” Such statements reflect a growing trend of politicizing judicial institutions, which risks eroding public trust in their impartiality. The attack on the Constitutional Court is not isolated. It follows a long-standing pattern of undermining institutional checks and balances. In Slovenia, the separation of powers is theoretically well-established, with the judiciary holding the highest status among the three branches of government. However, the process of appointing judges remains under the control of the legislative branch, specifically the National Assembly. For example, the current president of the Republic, Nataša Pirc Musar, has played a key role in selecting new constitutional judges, often aligning with the ruling coalition’s interests. This dynamic raises serious concerns about the independence of the judiciary. While the Constitution guarantees judicial autonomy, the appointment process allows for political influence. The current system enables the ruling party to secure long-term advantages by ensuring that judges appointed under its leadership remain loyal. With nine-year mandates for constitutional judges and four-year terms for legislators, there is a clear imbalance in how political power can shape judicial outcomes. The erosion of judicial independence has real-world consequences. When politicians publicly accuse courts of being politically motivated or even illegal, they risk normalizing the idea that institutions designed to check power are themselves corrupt. This undermines the very principles of democracy that rely on the rule of law. The recent controversy surrounding the Constitutional Court’s decision on the RTV Slovenia law illustrates this point. Only one judge, Marko Starman, voted against the ruling, highlighting the lack of internal dissent within the court. Historically, the Constitutional Court has occasionally resisted political pressure. In the 1990s, it protected RTV Slovenia from excessive political interference, even as the ruling party sought to remove the head of the broadcaster. At that time, the court maintained a degree of independence, despite the political climate. However, recent developments suggest a shift toward greater alignment with the ruling party, raising alarms among legal scholars and watchdog organizations. Legal experts warn that the current situation could lead to a dangerous precedent. If the judiciary becomes increasingly dependent on political actors, it risks losing its role as a guardian of constitutional values. This is particularly concerning given the increasing concentration of political power in the hands of the ruling party, exacerbated by expedited legislative procedures and the rapid passage of laws. As the fourth Janša government continues its tenure, the challenge will be whether it can maintain democratic norms while consolidating control over key institutions.
3 reports
Nova24TVParty-alignedProgressiveFactual 65Objective 5511 days ago
The article discusses the separation of powers among legislative, executive, and judicial branches, referencing historical developments and current practices in Slovenia. It highlights how the Slovenian constitution follows this model, with the Constitutional Court tasked with protecting the constitution and human rights. The piece critiques the current system by pointing out that the selection of judges, including the Constitutional Court, is influenced by political actors, such as President Nataša Pirc Musar, who has proposed most of the current judges. This process requires a qualified majority but does not necessitate broader consensus, raising concerns about the court’s impartiality and legitimacy. The article notes that this dynamic allows political factions to secure long-term influence, potentially undermining the judiciary’s independence. It references past instances where former judges, like Špelca Mežnar and Golobova, were removed from office, suggesting a pattern of political manipulation within the constitutional framework.
Bias read (Progressive): The article frames the issue of judicial independence as a systemic threat caused by political influence over the appointment of judges, particularly highlighting the role of the president and the lack of broader consensus required for appointments. It implies that the current system enables certain
Why factuality (65): The article provides an overview of the separation of powers theory, referencing Montesquieu and Tocqueville accurately. It discusses historical implementations in the US Constitution and European constitutional monarchies, as well as examples from communist Yugoslavia. While these points are genera
Why objectivity (55): The tone is somewhat polemic, suggesting a critique of current political structures by implying that the separation of powers is being undermined. The phrase 'Mi smo oblast!' implies a strong stance, potentially biased towards a particular political viewpoint. The article also uses emotive language
DemokracijaParty-alignedProgressiveFactual 65Objective 5511 days ago
The article discusses the concept of separation of powers, particularly focusing on the judicial branch in Slovenia. It traces the historical development of this principle, starting with Montesquieu and later theorists like Tocqueville, and examines its implementation in various countries, including the United States and former Yugoslavia. In Slovenia, the Constitutional Court is highlighted as having a unique role in protecting the constitution and human rights, though its members are still appointed by the legislative body, which raises concerns about political influence. The piece notes that while the Constitutional Court is meant to be independent, its members' appointments often reflect the interests of the ruling coalition, potentially undermining its impartiality. This has led to situations where judges have been removed from office due to political pressures, such as the case of former Constitutional Council member Špela Mežnar. The article suggests that the current system allows political parties to secure long-term influence over the judiciary, thereby compromising the court’s legitimacy and independence.
Bias read (Progressive): The article critiques the political influence over the appointment of constitutional court judges in Slovenia, suggesting that the current system allows ruling coalitions to maintain control over the judiciary, thereby undermining judicial independence. While it does not explicitly advocate for a re
Why factuality (65): This article continues the discussion from the first, providing similar information about the separation of powers and historical contexts. It references the US Constitution, Yugoslav communism, and Slovenian institutions like the Constitutional Court. While the content is largely consistent with st
Why objectivity (55): The article maintains a similar tone to the first, using emotionally charged language such as 'rušenje razmerij' and implying a conflict between different branches of government. The phrase 'Mi smo oblast!' suggests a strong ideological position, likely supporting a particular political agenda. The
DnevnikIndependent🔒ConservativeFactual 50Objective 3014 days ago
The article discusses criticism from the Slovenian Social Democracy Party (SDS), particularly from MP Žan Mahnič, against the Constitutional Court's decision to invalidate a law allowing a referendum on intervention measures for Slovenia's development. Mahnič labeled the court as a 'Marxist circle' and a 'extension of radical left', suggesting that its decisions should be reconsidered. This follows a pattern of systematic attacks on judicial independence by the fourth Janša government, which has been noted by legal experts and international observers, including the European Commission. The article highlights concerns over politicized judiciary and the erosion of institutional legitimacy, while noting that such criticisms are increasingly common and often go unaddressed by the public and media.
Bias read (Conservative): The article frames the criticism of the Constitutional Court as legitimate political dissent, but uses strong language ('Marxist circle', 'radical left') and aligns with the SDS's narrative that the judiciary is politically biased. It emphasizes the government's stance against judicial independence,
Why factuality (50): The article discusses political criticism of the Constitutional Court by various parties, particularly the SDS, following a ruling on a referendum law. It references specific statements from MP Žan Mahnič calling the court a 'Marxist circle' and a 'extension of radical left'. While these claims alig
Why objectivity (30): The tone is clearly critical of the Constitutional Court and presents the political stance of the SDS as an attack on judicial independence. The language used ('vladavino neizvoljenih', 'sistematičnih napadov') carries a strong ideological bias. The article frames the actions of the SDS as part of a
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