Milei danes napoveduje reformo centralne banke: kaj je organska listina in opozorila analitikov

President Javier Milei will announce today a proposed reform of the Organic Charter of the Bank of the Republic of Argentina (BCRA), a key economic initiative on his government’s agenda for the second half of the year. The announcement, scheduled for 8 p.m., will be made via a recorded national broadcast and marks the preliminary step before submitting the proposal to Congress. The reform was developed with input from the Ministry of Economy, the BCRA itself, and the Ministry of Deregulation and State Transformation. The official goal of the reform is to modify the functions, restrictions, and governance structure of the central bank to prevent future governments from using monetary emission as a means of financing budget deficits. According to presidential spokesperson Adrián Ravier, the reform will rest on four pillars: establishing price stability as the sole mandate of the BCRA, prohibiting monetary financing of the Treasury, strengthening the independence and stability of its leadership, and limiting the transfer of accounting profits to the state. The Organic Charter of the BCRA defines how the central bank operates, outlines its responsibilities, and establishes its organizational structure. Its content is crucial for monetary policy, as it determines how much the bank can issue to assist the Treasury, which objectives it must prioritize, and the degree of autonomy it has relative to the executive branch. One of the main changes involves replacing the current broad mandate of the BCRA with a singular objective focused on preserving the value of money. The existing charter states that the institution should promote monetary and financial stability, employment, and economic development with social equity within the framework of national policies. This structure was introduced during the 2012 reform under Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's second term. Milei argues that having multiple objectives allows for discretionary use of monetary policy and blurs the responsibility of the central bank regarding inflation. The proposed reform aims to make price stability the exclusive mission of the entity. In practical terms, the BCRA would no longer explicitly include promoting employment and economic development among its stated purposes. For the government, this change would establish a clearer rule for evaluating the performance of its authorities: the agency’s success would primarily be measured by its ability to preserve the purchasing power of the currency. Another key aspect of the reform is the elimination or restriction of mechanisms allowing the BCRA to financially support the Treasury. Specifically, the government seeks to modify the regime of temporary advances, historically used to cover fiscal needs through peso emissions. The proposal targets Article 21 of the Organic Charter, which regulates these transfers. The intention is to prevent the executive branch from relying on the BCRA to finance deficits, even in situations where accessing debt markets proves difficult. Milei asserts that monetary emission aimed at covering fiscal imbalances was one of the primary causes of Argentina’s inflation. Therefore, the reform attempts to transform the current fiscal balance policy into an institutional limitation for future administrations. The project could also strengthen the responsibilities and penalties applicable to officials who directly or indirectly use the BCRA to fund the state. The reform also includes provisions to enhance the independence of the central bank’s leadership. One possible measure involves increasing the tenure of central bank governors and ensuring their appointments are based on technical qualifications rather than political considerations. Additionally, the reform may introduce stricter oversight mechanisms to ensure compliance with the new mandates. The BCRA recently resumed dollar purchases, and its reserves have exceeded $49 billion. This move underscores the central bank’s role in managing foreign exchange reserves and maintaining confidence in the Argentine peso. However, the proposed reforms aim to shift the focus away from such interventions toward a more transparent and predictable monetary policy framework. Analysts have expressed mixed reactions to the proposed changes. Some welcome the move as a necessary step toward stabilizing Argentina’s economy and curbing inflation. Others caution that the reform could face resistance from lawmakers and may require extensive negotiations before being enacted. The success of the reform will depend largely on the willingness of Congress to approve the changes and the ability of the government to implement them effectively.