FIP: U ukupnom mirovnom bilansu oružane skupine broje 28 tisuća članova

Colombia’s newly announced Plan Patriota 2.0 has reignited concerns over the country's security strategy, echoing past approaches that have drawn criticism for their heavy reliance on military force rather than comprehensive peacebuilding efforts. The initiative, unveiled by the incoming government led by Abelardo de la Espriella, appears to continue a pattern established by previous administrations, including the Plan Colombia and the earlier Plan Patriota. These strategies were initially framed with promises of social development but ended up prioritizing military operations against drug trafficking and insurgent groups. The Plan Patriota 2.0 is being presented as a continuation of this approach, emphasizing high interoperability with U.S. forces and focusing heavily on technology and coalition-building. However, critics argue that it lacks the structural reforms necessary to address the root causes of ongoing violence and instability. According to experts, the new plan seems more aligned with geopolitical interests than addressing the specific security challenges faced by regions such as the Cauca, Catatumbo, and Chocó departments. The recent assassination of two police officers in Ataco, Tolima, underscores the growing threat posed by armed groups operating in these areas. Subintendents Yeiferson Meneses Aranda and Edison Cuesta Forero were killed during a routine patrol in Santiago Pérez, a rural area known for illegal gold mining activities controlled by dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The attack was attributed to the Ismael Ruiz group, which operates in both Tolima and the neighboring Huila department. Local authorities expressed deep concern over the incident, with the governor of Tolima, Adriana Magali Matiz, condemning the attack as an assault on the state and democracy. She emphasized the need for heightened vigilance and immediate action to prevent further violence. In response, local officials implemented measures such as curfews and alcohol bans while conducting operations to locate and capture those responsible for the killings. The situation in Tolima reflects broader trends highlighted by the Foundation for Peace (FIP), which recently released a report indicating a significant increase in the number of armed group members since the start of President Gustavo Petro’s administration. According to the FIP, the total number of armed individuals rose from approximately 15,000 to nearly 28,000 over four years. This growth includes a substantial increase in the ranks of the Clan del Golfo, now estimated at 10,000 members, compared to 4,000 four years ago. The report criticizes the current peace initiatives for failing to reduce the power of armed groups, instead providing them with reasons to intensify pressure on civilians or engage in new conflicts. While some localized reductions in violence have been noted, such as decreased homicide rates in certain regions, these gains are considered fragile and insufficient to significantly weaken the capabilities of armed organizations. Experts suggest that future negotiations should integrate diplomatic efforts with robust security strategies and establish clear legal frameworks to incentivize disarmament. They emphasize the importance of presidential leadership in ensuring coherence and effectiveness in peace processes, noting that the lack of consistent oversight under the current administration has hindered progress. As Colombia moves forward with its new security policies, the challenge lies in balancing military engagement with long-term structural reforms aimed at addressing the underlying issues fueling conflict. The success of any new strategy will depend on its ability to incorporate diverse perspectives and ensure sustainable change beyond mere tactical adjustments.