United StatesThe article discusses the limitations of nuclear deterrence by examining recent conflicts involving Ukraine, Russia, and Iran. It highlights Ukraine's use of long-range missiles and drones against Russian military infrastructure, including nuclear assets, without triggering a nuclear response from Moscow. The piece references historical examples such as the 1973 Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel, the 1982 Falklands War, and the Vietnam War to argue that nuclear weapons have not consistently deterred aggression. Former U.S. and NATO official Rose Gottermoeller critiques the effectiveness of deterrence theory, noting that even powerful nuclear states like the U.S., Russia, and Israel have engaged in provocative actions without facing nuclear retaliation. The article concludes by suggesting that nuclear-armed states may feel emboldened to challenge international norms.
Bias read (Progressive): The article frames nuclear deterrence as an outdated and ineffective concept, emphasizing cases where nuclear-armed states have acted aggressively without facing proportional retaliation. It criticizes traditional deterrence theories and highlights instances where non-nuclear states have challenged核
