UAE warned Netanyahu of major Hamas attack days before October 7 massacre, Haaretz reports
A Haaretz investigation claims that UAE President Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about an impending major Hamas operation days before the October 7 massacre. According to the report, the warning came during a 45-minute conversation approximately 10 days prior to the attack. Despite the UAE's concerns about potential regional instability and threats to the Abraham Accords, Netanyahu reportedly dismissed the warning, stating he believed Hamas would target the West Bank and assured the UAE that Israel was prepared. The warning was later passed to Israeli security services, including Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, who raised alarms about an imminent conflict. However, Netanyahu did not include this information in subsequent security briefings, leading to criticism that the Israeli leadership failed to act on critical intelligence.
Netanyahu rejected the recommendation by Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar to carry out a targeted assassination of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar before the October 7, 2023, attack, according to a security source cited by The Jerusalem Post. The meeting between Bar and Netanyahu occurred on October 1, 2023, just over a week prior to the attack. Bar conveyed concerns that Hamas was “preparing something extreme” and referred to the threat as an “earthquake.” Despite these warnings, Netanyahu declined the proposal to eliminate Sinwar and other senior Hamas figures. The report adds context to a separate claim by Haaretz that UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan had also warned Netanyahu about Sinwar’s plans several days before the attack. According to the Haaretz investigation, MBZ called Netanyahu from Abu Dhabi approximately 10 days before the October 7 assault. The conversation lasted around 45 minutes, during which MBZ expressed fears that Sinwar was organizing a significant operation that could result in widespread violence, regional instability, and damage to the Abraham Accords. Netanyahu reportedly responded with calm confidence, asserting that Hamas intended to focus its efforts in the West Bank and that Israel was prepared for any scenario. The warning from MBZ was relayed through a Palestinian intermediary known to Israeli intelligence as “black eyes,” a Fatah official with connections to both Hamas and Israeli authorities. This individual informed MBZ that Sinwar had referred to the impending operation as an “earthquake” and described it as “the mother of all surprises.” The message was eventually passed to Israeli security services, with Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar informing Netanyahu about Sinwar’s threats shortly afterward. Despite receiving these warnings, Netanyahu did not share them with the heads of Israel’s security establishment, including the Shin Bet and Mossad, nor did he alert the IDF chief of staff. As a result, the security apparatus remained unaware of the potential threat, according to the report. Former Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar and former IDF chief of staff Herzi Halevi both told Haaretz they were not informed of the UAE warning. Security officials have since disputed the claim that the outcome could have been altered had the warnings reached the relevant decision-makers. They argue that the intelligence available to the security establishment on the night of October 6–7 was incomplete and did not conclusively indicate an imminent large-scale attack. Some of the information even suggested routine activity within Gaza, rather than an immediate threat. In response to the report, the Prime Minister’s Office called it “a total lie,” denying that Netanyahu had spoken with the UAE president during the period in question. However, former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett endorsed the findings, stating that the report was “true” and that the UAE and Egyptian warnings were genuine. Bennett criticized Netanyahu for failing to act on the information and for not convening a security assessment, which he argued could have prevented the attack. Yair Lapid, another opposition leader, echoed similar criticisms, claiming that he had personally warned Netanyahu three weeks before the attack and that multiple entities, including Egypt and the Shin Bet, had also attempted to alert him. Lapid asserted that if Netanyahu had acted on these warnings, the massacre might have been avoided. Former IDF chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot accused Netanyahu of evading responsibility and promoting conspiracy theories to deflect blame. Eisenkot claimed that Netanyahu’s circle was spreading narratives suggesting that the security establishment failed to warn him, rather than acknowledging the prime minister’s role in downplaying the threat. MK Chili Tropper of Yashar criticized Netanyahu’s public campaign that he was unaware of the warnings, arguing that it was unfair to the victims’ families. He noted that the security establishment’s failure to act was evident, and that many families felt their loved ones could have been saved had the information been properly handled. The report continues to draw scrutiny, with some Israeli officials and analysts questioning whether Netanyahu’s handling of the warnings contributed to the scale of the October 7 attack. The ongoing debate highlights deep divisions within Israeli politics over accountability and the effectiveness of the country’s security apparatus.
On October 1, 2023, Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar advised Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to carry out a targeted assassination of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and other senior Hamas officials, citing intelligence that Hamas was preparing an 'extreme' action. Despite the warning, Netanyahu rejected the recommendation. This comes amid reports that UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed also warned Netanyahu about a week and a half prior, stating Sinwar was planning a major move that could lead to regional instability. While Netanyahu acknowledged the threat, he believed Hamas would target the West Bank rather than Tel Aviv. The UAE's concerns were relayed to U.S. officials, including CIA Director William Burns, but the warnings were not fully acted upon by Israeli authorities.
Bias read (Center): While the article presents multiple perspectives, Shin Bet’s recommendation, UAE President’s warning, and Netanyahu’s decision, it does not overtly favor one side over another. It provides balanced reporting on the differing assessments and actions taken by Israeli leaders and foreign officials. There
Why factuality (88): This article provides specific details about the Shin Bet meeting with Netanyahu and the rejection of the assassination plan. It corroborates the claim made in the previous article regarding the UAE warning and adds new context about the Shin Bet's role. The information aligns closely with the cross
Why objectivity (78): The article remains relatively neutral in tone, presenting facts without overtly criticizing Netanyahu. However, it does include quotes from a security source that suggest Netanyahu ignored warnings, which can subtly influence perception.
Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett confirmed reports that Benjamin Netanyahu was warned by the UAE about Hamas leader Khaled Mesalaha's (Sinwar) plans for an attack on Israel days before the October 7 massacre. Bennett criticized Netanyahu for failing to act on the warning, accusing him of not informing security leaders or preparing for the attack. Yair Lapid also alleged that he and other officials, including Egypt and intelligence agencies, had warned Netanyahu, who allegedly ignored these alerts. Former IDF chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot added that Netanyahu bears responsibility for the attack, suggesting his leadership contributed to the failure to prevent the violence.
Bias read (Progressive): The article frames Netanyahu's actions in a negative light, emphasizing his failure to act despite multiple warnings. It highlights criticism from left-leaning figures like Bennett, Lapid, and Eisenkot, while downplaying potential counterarguments or alternative explanations. The language suggests a
Why factuality (87): The article accurately reflects the content of the Haaretz report and includes statements from Naftali Bennett confirming the warning. It aligns with the cross-source consensus and provides additional context about Bennett's criticism of Netanyahu. The information is well-supported by the other arti
Why objectivity (70): The article has a more overtly critical tone toward Netanyahu, using strong language such as 'personal and direct responsibility.' This framing leans into a particular perspective, reducing the overall neutrality of the piece.
A Haaretz investigation claims that UAE President Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about an impending major Hamas operation days before the October 7 massacre. According to the report, the warning came during a 45-minute conversation approximately 10 days prior to the attack. Despite the UAE's concerns about potential regional instability and threats to the Abraham Accords, Netanyahu reportedly dismissed the warning, stating he believed Hamas would target the West Bank and assured the UAE that Israel was prepared. The warning was later passed to Israeli security services, including Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, who raised alarms about an imminent conflict. However, Netanyahu did not include this information in subsequent security briefings, leading to criticism that the Israeli leadership failed to act on critical intelligence.
Bias read (Progressive): The article frames the failure of Israeli leadership to act on warnings as a critical oversight, implying negligence or incompetence. It emphasizes the UAE's proactive role in providing intelligence and contrasts it with Netanyahu's dismissive attitude. The narrative suggests that the Israeli side's
Why factuality (85): The article presents specific details such as the timing of the conversation (10 days before the attack), the involvement of MBZ, and the dismissal of the warning by Netanyahu. These claims align with the cross-source consensus found in other articles, though no primary source is available to verify
Why objectivity (75): The article uses phrases like 'reportedly dismissed the warning' and 'failed to mention the warning,' which imply judgment about Netanyahu's actions. While it does not explicitly criticize Netanyahu, the framing suggests a negative interpretation of his response to the warning.
The Times of IsraelIndependentProgressiveFactual: no official source document/info detectedObjective 809/8/2026
The article reports that days before the October 7 attack, UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan allegedly conveyed a warning to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about Hamas planning a major operation. According to the report, the warning was relayed through Hamas leader Youssef al-Sinwar, who expressed readiness to launch an 'earthquake' during stalled peace talks. The article claims that Netanyahu did not share this information with Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security agency. Israeli former prime minister Naftali Bennett endorsed the report's accuracy.
Bias read (Progressive): The article frames the failure to act on the UAE warning as a significant oversight by Netanyahu, implying potential negligence or incompetence. It emphasizes the gravity of the situation and criticizes the leadership's response, which aligns with a left-leaning perspective that often scrutinizes政府官
Why factuality: no official source document/info detected
Why objectivity (80): The article maintains a relatively neutral tone while presenting the facts. It avoids explicit criticism of Netanyahu but does highlight the inaction in response to the warning, which could slightly affect objectivity.
How each side covered it
The same event, grouped by the political lean of the outlets covering it.
progressive
center
conservative
★
How each side covered it
Support independent, bias-aware news and unlock the social pulse, community voting, and every other Supporter feature.
IL
