He paid 10 billion to Butcher for his beef company, and he loaned someone three times that.

In late 2025, Mészáros Lőrinc, the owner of the construction company V-Híd Zrt., received nearly 10 billion forints in dividends from his firm. This amount was drawn from the company’s profits despite a notable decline in both revenue and taxable income compared to previous years. The V-Híd Zrt., which specializes in railway construction projects, reported an annual turnover of 168 billion forints last year, representing a decrease of 20 billion forints when compared to its performance in 2024. Meanwhile, its taxable profit dropped significantly, from 39 billion forints two years prior to just 26 billion forints in 2025.

The drop in profitability can be partially attributed to financial operations that reduced the profit by 19 billion forints. In contrast, similar transactions in 2024 had increased the profit by 17 billion forints. Despite these fluctuations, Mészáros and his wealth management company, which also holds shares in V-Híd Zrt., extracted 9.8 billion forints in dividends from the company. Over the past eight years, this method has contributed approximately 150 billion forints to Mészáros and his family's fortune.

V-Híd Zrt. operates under a business model where it does not directly execute construction work but instead subcontracts such tasks to other companies. According to the company’s annual report, there were no physical employees on staff during the previous year. The average statistical workforce size was recorded as 0.08 individuals, suggesting that physical labor was employed for only a month at a time. However, the company spent over 70 billion forints on services related to construction and installation works. This spending pattern highlights how the company relies almost entirely on state and European Union contracts to sustain its operations.

Despite its reliance on public funding, V-Híd Zrt. is often cited as a prime example of the so-called "NER" phenomenon, referring to companies that benefit from high efficiency in securing government contracts, thereby enabling their owners—often with strong political connections—to gain substantial profits. These firms typically operate without direct competition due to their ability to secure lucrative public tenders.

Another significant aspect revealed in the company’s annual report is the loan of more than 32 billion forints to an unspecified entity, which was extended for a longer period. The report does not specify who the recipient is, nor whether they are part of the same corporate group. It is clear, however, that this transaction involves a third party outside the immediate circle of the company’s ownership structure.

In early April 2025, shortly before the general elections, a transfer of 3.39 billion forints occurred from the account of the V-Híd Group’s asset management company, V-Híd Vagyonkezelő Kft., to Mészáros Lőrinc’s personal bank account. This transaction took place on a Thursday and adds another layer to the financial dealings involving Mészáros and his affiliated entities.

The company’s business practices have long been scrutinized, particularly regarding its lack of direct involvement in construction activities and its heavy dependence on public contracts. Its operational model allows it to achieve large profits while maintaining minimal direct employment. This has raised questions about transparency and accountability within the organization.

Efforts have been made to contact representatives of the Mészáros group to seek clarification on several issues, including the reasons behind the reduction in profit and the identity of the entity that received the 32 billion forint loan. As of now, no responses have been received. If further information becomes available, it will be incorporated into future updates of this report.