Petro launches new fraud complaints without support after second round

The integrity and transparency of Colombia's electoral system have come under scrutiny as the country approaches its second-round presidential election. Despite these concerns raised by various political sectors, Colombia has one of the most monitored electoral systems in Latin America. This system relies on a combination of national and international observation, nearly 860,000 voting judges, electoral witnesses, technological audits, judicial oversight, and regulatory bodies that supervise each stage of the process. The strength of this institutional framework was tested during the first round of the presidential elections held on May 31. Reports from both national and international observers indicated that the elections proceeded clearly and met standards that ensured the will of citizens without opacity.

International observation serves as one of the main supports for the electoral process. The Mission of Electoral Observation (MOE) deployed observers in 31 departments, covering 77 percent of the national electoral potential. In parallel, the European Union's mission observed 591 tables in 30 departments. Additionally, around 14,000 citizen observers and more than 1,300 accredited international observers participated. The EU's Electoral Observation Mission (MOE EU), which deployed 143 observers from 24 European countries plus Canada, stated in a report after the first round that "observers rated all phases of the process as transparent, orderly, and smooth."

These conclusions are vital in a context marked by narratives about electoral fraud and manipulation. José Jesús Hernández, a judge of the Electoral Court of Mexico City, affirmed that "Colombia has a solid democracy and a proven system." Similarly, José Luis Mateos, a professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Salamanca, stated that "the electoral process has sufficient guarantees to enjoy the legitimacy expected from a consolidated democracy." Jennie Lincoln, director of the Carter Center for Latin America and the Caribbean, emphasized that while the scrutiny commissions continue their important work of tabulation and verification of official results, the Carter Center calls on all actors to respect the electoral process, which is functioning as it should. José Antonio de Gabriel, deputy head of the EU's Electoral Observation Mission, also highlighted that "what we see is a powerful and institutionalized democracy that generates guarantees for citizens going to the polls and for candidates."

Another guarantee of the system is the approximately 860,000 voting judges designated for this year’s presidential elections. Far from the false versions circulating on social media, they are not chosen by campaigns or political parties. They are randomly selected citizens using audited software based on databases from companies, educational institutions, and public entities. Their role is crucial: they receive voters, verify their identity, issue electoral cards, conduct the initial vote count, and complete the E-14 forms that serve as the basis for the official scrutiny. The MOE EU noted that the Registration Office reinforced its training and highlighted that electoral officials demonstrated "professionalism and independence in carrying out their duties."

President Gustavo Petro has added new unsubstantiated theories to his narrative against the electoral system. In February, he claimed there could be fraud due to blank spaces in the E-14 ballots without votes. Later, he said that was no longer the problem but rather the "algorithms" and the supposed lack of auditing of the software. After the first round, he spoke of 885,000 additional names added to the electoral census. His claims, as verified one by one by the Detector of Lies, have had no support. Now, shortly before and after the preliminary count of the second round, he questioned the results with a new theory of alleged manipulation: the "time stamp" and the "hash lock" of the E-14.

On June 19, Petro wrote on X that "the Registration Office has hindered the verification of the E-14 by removing the algorithms that allow viewing the time traceability: the so-called 'time sheet' and the hash or lock that prevents alterations to the initially presented document." On June 21, after voting, he insisted that "the forms were stripped of two essential seals they already had, the time stamp and the security lock," and concluded that "any E-14 form can be changed at will at any time even after uploading it to the website." On June 22, after the preliminary results showed Abelardo de la Espriella as the winner, he reiterated that "the algorithms that suspended from the metabase of the E-14, such as the history stamp and the hash lock, did allow changing E-14 forms already posted." The same claim had been made by Senator Aída Avella on May 29 before the first round, and Petro repeated it.

Also, after the second round, Petro published two images on X that he presented as "existing algorithms proving external vulnerability" of the company responsible for the electoral logistics, and asserted that "powerful states with computational capacity" could "replace Colombians" thanks to these vulnerabilities. However, the reality is different. The Registration Office did not remove the hash lock or the time stamp: they are in a channel accessible to auditors, political campaigns, and observation missions, and they were contractually obligated from the start. This was confirmed independently by the MOE.

The official scrutiny, which determines the results and has legal validity, does not use the digital images published on the web but the physical acts of each table, under the custody of judges and notaries, and in the presence of party witnesses. The images that Petro presented on June 22 as "algorithms proving vulnerability" do not speak of alteration of E-14 forms or manipulation of results.

The time stamp and hash lock are available for campaigns and auditors. The president refers to the mechanisms of digitization of the E-14 forms, which are the forms of each table that the voting judges fill out once they perform the preliminary vote count, a preliminary and informative process of the results. Three copies are filled out with different purposes: those of 'transmission' to inform the preliminary count; 'delegates,' for immediate publication at polling stations and later on the internet, and those of 'claveros,' which enter the sealed bag with the votes for the official scrutiny. The Registration Office and the Electoral Observation Mission (MOE) confirmed that the mechanisms mentioned by Petro are indeed available for auditors, political campaigns, and observation missions.

The first is the hash code: a unique string of characters derived from the content of a file that changes with any modification, however minor. This property makes it a digital fingerprint that allows verifying whether a document has not been altered. The time stamp, on the other hand, is a record indicating the moment when the document was created or modified.

False claims have circulated on social media regarding the signatures of the voting judges on the E-14 forms following the preliminary count of the second round. A thread on X asserts that "the E-14 forms of today's electoral day, unlike the same forms from 2022, did not have space for the signatures of the voting judges." President Gustavo Petro posted: "The Registration Office is uploading E-14 forms without the signatures of the voting judges." Petro attached a video in which a user reviews one of these acts and does not load the page where the judges' signatures would be. Other users have also posted similar content.

However, this is false. The E-14 forms from the second round of the presidential election did have space for the signatures and observations of the voting judges. This is evident on the Registration Office's website. The Detector of Lies confirmed that the design of the E-14 forms this year did include the designated space for the signatures of the voting judges.

From the beginning, in the training booklet for judges, the Registration Office clarified that at the end of all E-14 forms, there is space for the signature of the judges. The E-14 forms are the scrutiny act of each table that the voting judges fill out once the preliminary count of the votes is closed. These are three forms that are filled out identically with the results and uploaded to the Registration Office's website at different times.

The first ones uploaded are the E-14 of 'delegates,' which are now public. Then the 'transmission' ones (used for transmitting the data of the preliminary count) and the 'claveros' (which go directly to the official scrutiny with the physical votes). The image circulating on social media of the E-14 form in which supposedly there are no signatures of the judges is from table 24, position 01, zone 04 of the municipality of Itagüí in Antioquia. Reviewing that delegate E-14 on the Registration Office's website shows that it does have the space and the signatures of the judges. The form has two pages: on the first (the only one the user posted on X) appears the information about the votes, and on the second page appears the space for the judges' observations and their signatures. That is, the user on social media deliberately omitted that information.

The other E-14 that appears in the video that Petro posted is from the municipality of San Francisco (Cundinamarca): table 12, position 00, and zone 00. The Detector reviewed that delegate E-14 and found that the second page does appear with the signatures of the six judges and without any observations. Frey Muñoz, deputy director of the MOE, assured that the reason why it might not have appeared immediately is "because they uploaded it in a partial moment, for a quick delivery of results."

The Registration Office, in response to allegations about the supposed absence of the judges' signatures, responded on