Producing is not enough, it is necessary to ensure a decent income for the countryside

The Colombian government’s agricultural policy has been criticized for failing to ensure dignified incomes for rural producers, despite efforts to expand credit and promote production. A recent analysis highlights that while production levels have increased, the financial sustainability of farmers remains uncertain. The core issue lies in whether policies enable producers to recover their costs, generate sufficient profit, support their families, meet obligations, reinvest, and remain in agriculture. Production, productivity, and profitability are distinct metrics. Production refers to the total output, while productivity measures output per unit of land, labor, or capital. Profitability, however, depends on income after all real costs, such as seeds, fertilizers, hired and family labor, machinery, fuel, transportation, rental, interest, storage, insurance, taxes, losses, and depreciation, are deducted. Ignoring family labor can create a misleading picture of profitability. Government reports often emphasize hectares planted, tons produced, credits disbursed, exports, and programs executed. These indicators are valuable but insufficient. Colombia lacks a comprehensive public system to track, by region and supply chain, how much actually remains with the producer. This absence suggests that income has not been the primary focus of agricultural policy. The government led by President Gustavo Petro expanded credit access, promoted public purchases, supported productive projects, and addressed several crises. However, the impact on producers' income and long-term viability remains unclear. In 2025, Finagro issued $48.1 billion through 395,614 operations benefiting 312,837 producers. While 90% of beneficiaries were small-scale producers, the distribution was uneven. Large producers received $36.37 billion, accounting for 75.6% of the funds, whereas small producers collectively received just $6.18 billion, less than 12.9%. This disparity raises questions about the true meaning of “democratization” in resource allocation. Despite the large number of small producers, they received less than 13% of the total. Access to credit does not guarantee income. Farmers face unpredictable outcomes due to factors such as weather, pests, imports, selling prices, buyer discounts, and rising costs. In 2025, 34,041 operations totaling $5.57 billion were normalized, indicating a growing reliance on financing rather than improved profitability. A key weakness in the Petro administration's approach was the faster growth of credit compared to protections against loss. Projects were evaluated based on funds spent and beneficiaries reached, not on their survival beyond subsidies. Public procurement did not become a reliable mechanism for absorbing harvests. There was also a lack of a national network for collection, drying, cold storage, information, and transformation involving producers. Costs have also risen steadily. According to the Rural and Agricultural Planning Unit (Upra), fertilizer prices increased by 8.08% between January and July 2025. Meanwhile, agricultural exports reached $11.297 billion, and agro-industrial exports totaled $3.965 billion. These figures reflect success in certain sectors, particularly coffee, banana, and palm oil. However, they do not indicate improved income for producers of staple foods such as rice, milk, potatoes, corn, or other domestic market goods. The rice sector exemplifies the gap between production and profitability. Despite higher yields, many farmers struggle to cover increasing input costs and secure fair prices. This situation underscores the broader challenge: producing more does not equate to earning enough. Without mechanisms to ensure stable income, the sustainability of rural livelihoods remains under threat.