Pakistan’s attacks on Afghanistan are about more than the TTP

Pakistan’s recent aerial assaults on Afghan territory have sparked international concern over their scale and impact, with the most lethal strike occurring on March 16, 2026, when a drug rehabilitation center in Kabul was bombed, resulting in 269 civilian deaths and 122 injuries, according to United Nations records. This attack, part of a series of air strikes since October 2025, has drawn scrutiny beyond the immediate humanitarian toll, raising questions about the underlying motives behind these operations. The strikes, attributed to Pakistan, have targeted the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, a group the Pakistani government claims receives support from the Afghan Taliban. However, the Afghan Taliban has denied any involvement with the TTP, asserting that the insurgency is a domestic issue for Pakistan. Despite repeated military campaigns aimed at dismantling the TTP, none of its senior leaders or commanders have been eliminated. This raises doubts about whether the TTP is the primary focus of Pakistan’s actions or if there are deeper geopolitical considerations at play. The origins of the TTP trace back to within Pakistan’s borders. In November 1994, Sufi Mohammad initiated an armed rebellion in the Swat and Malakand regions, seeking to enforce Sharia law, a move unprecedented among clerics in the country. A decade later, Baitullah Mehsud, hailing from South Waziristan, consolidated various militant factions under the TTP banner. Mullah Fazlullah, Sufi Mohammad’s son-in-law, led the group from 2013 until his demise in a U.S. drone strike in 2018. Thus, the TTP's emergence predated the formation of the Afghan Taliban, highlighting the complex interplay of regional insurgencies. Over the last twenty years, the Pakistani military has executed nearly a dozen major offensives against the TTP. These efforts have not succeeded in eradicating the group, partly due to the nuanced stance Pakistan has historically maintained toward militants. The country has often distinguished between “good” and “bad” militants, allowing certain groups to persist under the guise of counterterrorism. This approach has inadvertently sustained militant networks and infrastructure, benefiting even the TTP. Analysts suggest that Pakistan’s covert support for the Afghan insurgency, aimed at weakening the former Afghan republic, has played a role in sustaining such groups. Pakistan’s engagement in Afghanistan dates back to the early days of the Cold War. After the 1978 communist coup in Afghanistan and the subsequent Soviet invasion, Pakistan became a crucial Western ally, especially for the United States, in curbing Soviet influence. During this period, Pakistan hosted Afghan dissidents such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmad Shah Massoud, who had fled during President Mohammad Daoud Khan’s regime. With U.S. backing, Pakistan emerged as the central hub for supporting the Afghan mujahideen. Local communities along the Durand Line were systematically exposed to radicalization through the establishment of numerous madrassas, distribution of jihadist literature, and encouragement of local fighters to join the Afghan resistance. Following the September 11 attacks, the Pakistani military, under General Pervez Musharraf, publicly aligned with the U.S.-led “war on terror,” yet continued to support select militant groups deemed strategically advantageous. The discovery of Osama bin Laden near Islamabad, where he was killed by U.S. Navy SEALs in 2011, remains a symbolic indictment of this dual strategy. Many experts remain skeptical about Pakistan’s genuine intent to dismantle the TTP and other militant organizations. They propose that Islamabad views some groups as strategic assets, aiming not to eradicate militancy entirely but to maintain it at a level that can be managed as a controlled insurgency. If the TTP alone does not fully account for Pakistan’s attacks on Afghanistan, what broader strategic goals might be driving these actions? Pakistan has not relinquished its long-standing pursuit of “strategic depth” in Afghanistan. Traditionally, this concept referred to fostering a sympathetic government in Kabul capable of offering both political and military support. While the specifics of current ambitions remain unclear, the pattern suggests that Islamabad continues to view Afghanistan as a critical arena for shaping regional dynamics.