Former European Commissioner accused of money laundering and influence over intelligence services for Russia

Belgian investigators have obtained WhatsApp messages exchanged between former European Commissioner for Justice Didier Reynders and Hugues Brulin, a senior official at the Belgian State Security Service, known as VSSE. The correspondence, spanning from September 2019 to April 2023, allegedly reveals coordinated efforts to halt investigations into Reynders’ suspected links with Russian intelligence structures. Reynders faces charges related to money laundering involving approximately one million euros. As the former justice commissioner, he had access to strictly confidential documents from both the European Union and NATO. He belongs to the liberal political group Renew Europe, which includes the Slovenian party Gibanje Svoboda, represented in parliament by Marjan Šarec and Irena Joveva. The most incriminating communication dates to December 2022. In this message, Brulin informed Reynders that the task was mostly finished, referencing a reorganization of the intelligence service’s leadership structure. Reynders replied, Bravo for the work done. Although the two discussed personnel changes within the Belgian intelligence agency, five current and former intelligence officers stated that the true objective was to prevent further investigation of Reynders. According to these sources, three agents lost their jobs because their inquiries into Reynders’ alleged corrupt dealings and connections to Russia led directly to him. One source explained that when Brulin spoke of the task, he meant stopping all probes into Reynders. Careers were destroyed if investigations pointed toward Reynders and Russia. Another source noted that some agents began self-censoring reports on Russian activities due to fear of dismissal. This source described it as unusual that Reynders could become the EU justice commissioner given the information available at the time. The correspondence also discloses attempts to discredit Nicolas Ullens, a former Belgian intelligence officer who resigned in protest in 2018. Ullens later publicly accused Reynders of collaborating with Russian intelligence services, labeling him a significant Russian spy. Ullens claimed that Reynders, while serving as Belgium’s foreign minister, made decisions benefiting Moscow. Specifically, he cited interference in procedures regarding the seizure of Russian state assets in 2015. He also criticized Belgium’s limited response to the attempted poisoning of former Russian agent Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom in 2018, noting that Belgium expelled only one Russian diplomat. Ullens argued that allies of Reynders within the intelligence service restricted the work of the Russian counter-intelligence department. Consequently, that unit focused primarily on Russian diplomats rather than potential Russian agents operating in other sectors within Belgium. In September 2019, Brulin offered Reynders assistance in launching a counterattack against Ullens. In their messages, the pair insulted the former officer, calling him a madman. Ullens reported alleged death threats to Belgian police in 2019, claiming they originated from Reynders’ colleagues inside the intelligence service. One source emphasized that Ullens possessed the best informants and intelligence sources. That source believed the subsequent investigation into Reynders’ alleged money laundering would further strengthen Ullens’ claims. Ullens is currently on trial for murder connected to a family dispute, a case unrelated to his previous employment in the intelligence service. Reynders served as the European Commissioner for Justice, a role that granted him access to highly sensitive data. His political affiliation places him within the Renew Europe group. The allegations suggest that internal mechanisms within Belgian security structures were manipulated to protect a high-ranking politician. The period covered by the messages extends over nearly four years, ending in early 2023. The financial aspect of the case involves the laundering of roughly one million euros. The individuals mentioned include Marjan Šarec and Irena Joveva, members of the parliamentary group associated with Reynders’ political faction. The intelligence officials who spoke described a culture of fear where professional advancement depended on avoiding certain lines of inquiry. The reorganization of the leadership structure mentioned in the December 2022 message appears to have been the vehicle for removing those who pursued the investigation. Ullens’ departure from the service in 2018 preceded the bulk of the messaging evidence. His public accusations gained traction after he left his position. The specific mention of the Skripal incident highlights diplomatic tensions during that period. The focus of the counter-intelligence department shifting away from non-diplomatic agents suggests a narrowing of scope that favored the subject of the investigation. The sources indicate that the pressure was systematic rather than isolated incidents. The relationship between Reynders and Brulin appears to have involved direct coordination on personnel matters within the security apparatus. The legal proceedings against Reynders are ongoing alongside the criminal trial facing Ullens. The evidence presented relies heavily on digital communications retrieved by investigators. The impact on the integrity of intelligence reporting is described as severe, with staff altering their written assessments to avoid repercussions. The connection to Chinese interests is hinted at in the broader context of the investigation materials, though the primary focus remains on Russian links. The scale of the alleged obstruction involves multiple departments and long-term career impacts for several employees. The political implications extend beyond national borders due to Reynders’ role in Brussels. The confidentiality of the documents involved underscores the sensitivity of the positions held by the accused. The timeline shows a sustained effort beginning shortly after Reynders assumed his European role. The responses from the intelligence community reflect a consensus among insiders regarding the motive behind the personnel changes. The case illustrates the intersection of political power and security oversight in Belgium. The specific figures named provide context for the political network surrounding the accused. The method of communication used, WhatsApp, facilitated the exchange of sensitive operational advice. The outcome for the three dismissed agents included the loss of their careers. The self-censorship observed among remaining staff indicates a chilling effect on open reporting. The historical references to 2015 asset seizures and 2018 diplomatic expulsions ground the allegations in specific past events. The current status of Ullens involves a separate criminal charge unrelated to espionage. The overall picture emerging from the sources points to a deliberate strategy to insulate a political figure from scrutiny.