Kazakhstan's future after the elections: Russia, EU or China

Kazakhstan’s upcoming parliamentary elections, set for August 23, mark a pivotal moment in the nation’s political landscape following the adoption of a new constitution. The legislative body will shift from a two-chamber system to a single-chamber assembly known as the Kurultai, with citizens voting for 145 members through party lists. Seven registered parties, including the ruling Adilet, meaning “Justice”, are eligible to participate. However, analysts suggest that the ruling party, backed by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, is poised to dominate the results, reinforcing his grip on power. The transition to a single-chamber parliament aligns with constitutional changes enacted earlier this year, which permit Tokayev to seek another seven-year presidential term in 2029. These reforms have drawn attention for their potential to centralize authority within the presidency while diminishing the influence of the former leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who governed from 1991 to 2019. According to experts, the new structure aims to streamline governance under Tokayev’s leadership, reducing checks and balances within the legislature. Professor Luca Anceschi of the University of Glasgow notes that the new parliament is unlikely to serve as a genuine platform for dissenting voices. He argues that the assembly will continue to function as a tool for the regime, reflecting its priorities rather than offering independent representation. Similarly, Stefan Meister of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) believes the ruling party’s dominance is evident in recent opinion polls and that the election serves to consolidate Tokayev’s power. Zauresh Battalova, a former Kazakhstani senator turned NGO head, highlights concerns over the narrowing of political choices. With independent candidates barred from running under the current system, the election will rely solely on party lists. This setup limits the presence of genuine opposition and restricts voter options, according to Battalova, who emphasizes the importance of parliamentary oversight and autonomy. Despite these developments, European responses to the evolving political climate in Kazakhstan remain muted. Both Meister and Anceschi argue that the European Union and its member states are less inclined to criticize Central Asian nations due to strategic interests in regional trade routes and resource access. They suggest that civil society groups, the European Parliament, or the Council of Europe might take notice, but broader EU action appears unlikely. The shift in European policy comes amid the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, which has prompted a more pragmatic stance toward Central Asia. While the EU continues to monitor human rights issues, its focus has shifted toward economic partnerships and energy security, reducing direct engagement with internal political dynamics in countries like Kazakhstan. Analysts observe that the authoritarian consolidation in Kazakhstan mirrors similar trends in other Central Asian states. Despite this, Meister points out that Kazakhstan remains relatively less repressive compared to its neighbors, maintaining some level of civil society activity even if it is constrained. The upcoming elections underscore a broader trend of political centralization in Kazakhstan, with Tokayev’s administration seeking to solidify control through constitutional reforms and electoral mechanisms. As the nation moves forward, observers will watch closely to see how these changes affect domestic governance and international relations, particularly with key partners such as Russia, China, and the European Union.