SloveniaThe article discusses the ongoing conflict in South Sudan despite formal peace agreements, arguing that peace processes often fail because they maintain systems of violence and coercion rather than eliminating them. It highlights how power-sharing arrangements in peace deals typically preserve existing structures of control, allowing elites to retain influence while conflicts persist. The author, an economic historian specializing in war and peace processes, presents findings from fieldwork and archival research conducted between 2020 and 2024. These reveal that while peace agreements redistribute access to resources and political positions among ruling elites, they leave intact coercive mechanisms of revenue collection and wartime economies. In some cases, these mechanisms have been institutionalized, turning wartime gains into officially recognized functions such as tax collection or security oversight.
Bias read (Progressive): The article frames the persistence of conflict in South Sudan as a systemic issue rooted in the maintenance of coercive structures by elites through peace agreements. It critiques the failure of peace processes to dismantle entrenched systems of control and exploitation, suggesting that these perpet
