How Did Justice Sotomayor Assign Dissents in 6-3 Cases This Term?

In recent months, Justice Sonia Sotomayor has taken on a notable role within the U.S. Supreme Court, particularly in assigning dissents in several 6-3 decisions this term. As one of the more senior justices—ranked fourth in seniority—she has gained the authority to assign dissents in cases where the court splits along ideological lines. This responsibility has become especially significant since the retirement of Justice Stephen Breyer, leaving Sotomayor as the highest-ranking justice among the liberal bloc. With Chief Justice John Roberts typically aligning with the conservative majority, the opportunity for Sotomayor to shape the narrative of these rulings through her dissents has increased substantially.

This term, Sotomayor has authored dissents in multiple high-profile cases, including *West Virginia v. B.P.J.*, *Trump v. Slaughter*, and *Allen v. Milligan*. In each of these instances, she chose to write the dissent herself, asserting her voice in the judicial discourse. However, in other cases such as *Mullin v. Doe*, *NRSC v. FEC*, *Wolford v. Lopez*, *Exxon Mobile v. Climex*, and *Louisiana v. Callais*, she opted to assign the dissents to Justice Elena Kagan. Similarly, in cases like *Mullin v. Al Otro Lado*, *Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections*, and *Blanch v. Lau*, she directed the dissents to Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson. These assignments reflect a strategic approach to distributing the workload and possibly emphasizing certain viewpoints based on the justices' expertise or style.

Notably, Sotomayor’s decision to withhold the dissent in *Trump v. Slaughter* from Kagan sparked some commentary. While Kagan is widely regarded as one of the Court’s most eloquent and influential writers, Sotomayor’s dissent in *Slaughter* was described as less impactful compared to Kagan’s earlier work, particularly her landmark dissent in *Seila Law*. Some observers noted that Sotomayor’s dissent in *Slaughter* referenced *Seila Law* extensively, suggesting a deliberate attempt to connect the two cases. Yet, the absence of a Kagan dissent in *Slaughter* raised questions about the rationale behind the assignment, especially given the proximity of the arguments in both cases.

The broader implications of Sotomayor’s choices highlight the evolving dynamics within the Court. With the departure of Breyer, the balance of influence among the remaining justices has shifted, and Sotomayor’s role in shaping the Court’s output has grown. Her decisions to assign dissents to Kagan and Jackson also underscore the importance of stylistic and rhetorical considerations in the Court’s public communication. Each justice brings a unique voice to the bench, and the selection of authors can influence how the public perceives the Court’s reasoning and priorities.

Looking ahead, the pattern of dissent assignments will likely continue to evolve as the Court navigates complex legal issues and political pressures. The interplay between seniority, ideology, and personal style will remain central to how the Court presents its decisions to the public. As Sotomayor continues to play a pivotal role in shaping the Court’s narrative, her choices will undoubtedly remain a subject of analysis and discussion among legal scholars and commentators.