The time of coercion: US and Iran

The United States has launched a renewed wave of military strikes against Iran, marking a sharp escalation in tensions in the Middle East. On July 7, 2026, U.S. Central Command confirmed a new round of attacks targeting Iranian infrastructure, hitting over 80 sites including air defense systems, coastal radars, command-and-control centers, naval capabilities, and more than 60 small boats operated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. A second operation followed on July 8, striking nearly 90 additional targets such as missile and drone depots, coastal surveillance assets, military logistics infrastructure, and naval facilities along the Iranian coast. The scale of these strikes suggests that the ceasefire was not broken by a minor incident, but rather exhausted as a tool of containment. The immediate trigger for the attacks was attributed to Iranian strikes against commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. U.S. Central Command identified three ships among those targeted: the M/T Al Rekayyat, registered under the Marshall Islands flag; the M/T Wedyan, flagged under Saudi Arabia; and the M/T Cyprus Prosperity, registered in Liberia. By July 9, Reuters reported that tanker traffic through the strait had all but halted, with only two vessels recorded crossing during the morning hours. The conflict has moved beyond a bilateral dispute, threatening one of the world's most critical oil transit routes and raising global economic concerns. The core question surrounding this escalation is not merely why violence has returned, but why diplomatic efforts failed to secure even a brief pause. In the months prior, diplomatic channels remained open, with Oman playing a discreet role, Qatar advocating restraint, and the International Atomic Energy Agency maintaining focus on Iran’s nuclear program. However, diplomacy alone proved insufficient. Sustained negotiations were accompanied by sanctions, warnings, military deployments, Israeli pressure, and deep-seated distrust that no interim formula could overcome. Negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program have long been complicated by structural imbalances. The issue requires technical mastery of uranium enrichment, inspections, verifiable guarantees, sanctions relief, missile programs, compliance sequences, and internal political margins. In this context, the U.S. delegation demonstrated a specific weakness, not due to a lack of negotiation ability, but due to inadequate preparation for high-complexity nuclear talks. The Arms Control Association raised concerns about the readiness of American negotiators for serious discussions with Iran, while Steve Witkoff managed multiple crises simultaneously. Iran, on the other hand, approached the negotiations with a different set of advantages. Abbas Araghchi, a key figure in the 2015 nuclear deal, and Majid Takht-Ravanchi, part of a diplomatic corps trained in similar matters, brought experience and strategic patience. While not idealizing Tehran, the difference is significant: Washington sought quick, verifiable, and politically palatable compromises, whereas Iran managed time, ambiguity, and partial concessions. This reflects a broader statecraft tradition in Iran, one not romanticized, but understood as a method of negotiating under sustained pressure. Israel further narrowed the margin for compromise. For Tel Aviv, Iran’s nuclear program is not just proliferation, but existential threat. That perspective has driven increased operations against Iranian interests, reinforcing regional instability and complicating diplomatic pathways. As the situation continues to evolve, the implications for international security and energy markets remain profound.