Garrote tecnológico EUA-Europa

The recent developments involving major U.S.-based technology companies have sparked significant concern regarding the strategic future of Europe. The U.S. administration has imposed restrictions on Anthropic, requiring them to suspend access to their most advanced models for international users. Just two weeks later, OpenAI was similarly compelled to restrict the release of its powerful new model, GPT-5.6, limiting access to a closed circle of approved U.S. companies and partners. This move underscores the growing recognition of artificial intelligence (AI) as a critical infrastructure asset, akin to a "sword of Damocles" controlled by the state where the technology is developed.

This situation marks the emergence of a technological chokehold in the realm of AI. Historically, such chokeholds have been associated with the global supply of oil, but in this case, the chokehold is not maritime—it is legal, technological, and geopolitical. It resides within data centers and the sovereign decisions made by states hosting these technology firms. For Europe, these incidents highlight an undeniable truth: without developing its own critical technologies, it remains irrevocably dependent on the will of others.

OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google currently provide the cognitive infrastructure for many European organizations. If the U.S. government decides that certain models should not be used by foreign entities, the repercussions are felt strongly across the European economy. The consequences extend beyond mere economic impact—they affect competitiveness and business operations. A European company could find itself cut off from access to the most advanced models due to a decision made by a foreign state. If top-tier models remain exclusive to U.S.-based enterprises, European counterparts would be left with outdated versions, creating a clear disparity in capabilities on the global stage. This dynamic inevitably pressures European businesses to relocate investments to the United States.

Seeking alternatives in other technological hubs presents its own set of risks. If the U.S. pushes Europe toward reliance on Chinese suppliers for AI models and infrastructure, the continent might merely swap one dependency for another. Any shift in China's leadership or policy direction could abruptly halt the flow of supplies. In such a scenario, Europe’s only alternative would be the Mistral project, which further emphasizes that technological sovereignty cannot be leased to third parties—it must be built domestically or it simply does not exist.

Europe has prioritized regulating AI at a pace faster than its ability to develop it. Brussels appears more focused on producing regulations rather than creating the fiscal, financial, and computational conditions necessary to build its own models. This approach results in regression: Europe regulates AI it does not create while stifling the AI upon which it depends. True sovereignty is not decreed through legislation alone; it is constructed through real tools and infrastructure. There is an urgent need for a dedicated European financial instrument aimed at frontier AI, capable of attracting private investment. Europe must establish regulatory sandboxes and offer incentives for U.S. companies to establish European headquarters with autonomous regulatory oversight.

No single European country can compete individually with American tech giants. However, collectively, Europe possesses the potential to rival them. What is lacking is institutional coordination and the concentration of financial resources, similar to what was achieved with the CERN project. If Europe continues treating AI solely as a bureaucratic compliance issue, it risks gradually becoming a dependent market, ultimately relegated to a regulatory museum where innovation enters only under tourist visas.